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THE STEALTH REVOLUTION IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Michael H. Hoffheimer 
Abstract 
Since 2011 the Roberts Court has decided six personal jurisdiction 
cases that impose significant new constitutional restrictions on the power 
of courts and limit plaintiffs’ access to justice. But the Court’s opinions 
explaining those decisions have repeatedly denied that the Court is 
altering settled law. 
This Article argues that the Court is engaged in a stealth revolution, a 
process of radically changing existing law while claiming to follow 
controlling precedent. By claiming to rely on precedent, the Court avoids 
the need to offer a clear rule of decision, fails to explain the policies that 
motivate its changing approach to personal jurisdiction, and fosters a 
narrative of lower court lawlessness that both devalues the work of the 
lower courts and erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 
This Article urges the Court to acknowledge that it is reforming the 
law of personal jurisdiction, to provide reasons for its new restrictions on 
the power of courts that are grounded on constitutional principle and 
sound policy, and to construct a narrative that relates its programmatic 
reform of personal jurisdiction to the history and purpose of the Due 
Process Clause or to some other appropriate constitutional authority. 
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Counsel, we’re dealing with the jurisdictional rule, and when 
we do that, we want the rules to be as simple as possible. 
  Chief Justice John Roberts1 
This is not a rule the Constitution has required before. 
  Justice Sonia Sotomayor2 
INTRODUCTION 
In spring 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two 
more personal jurisdiction cases, imposing new restrictions on where 
plaintiffs may force defendants to answer lawsuits.3 Following decades 
during which the Court decided no cases involving constitutional limits 
on personal jurisdiction,4 the Court has reviewed six lower court cases on 
the exercises of personal jurisdiction since 2011.5 Each time, the Court 
found that the lower court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction violated the 
Constitution.6 
Collectively, the Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions are 
changing the shape of litigation. New restrictions on jurisdiction make it 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-
Myers III), 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466). 
 2. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 3. See id. at 1773 (majority opinion); BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
 4. The Court’s only personal jurisdiction case between 1987 and 2011 was Burnham v. 
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 5. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); supra note 3 and accompanying text. The decisions 
have attracted considerable scholarly attention. See generally Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. 
Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2015) (discussing general personal jurisdiction after Court’s 
decision in Daimler); Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) (discussing general personal 
jurisdiction after Court’s decision in Goodyear); Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” 
Got to Do With It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 
729 (2012) (discussing personal jurisdiction after J. McIntyre and Goodyear); Adam N. Steinman, 
The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 481, 497–98 (2012) (discussing the various opinions in J. McIntyre). 
 6. See generally Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (holding California courts did not have 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant); BNSF Ry., 137 S. Ct. 1549 (holding Montana courts did 
not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (holding Nevada 
courts did not have personal jurisdiction over defendant); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (holding 
California courts did not have personal jurisdiction over defendant); Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 
(holding North Carolina courts did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants); J. McIntyre, 
564 U.S. 873 (plurality opinion) (holding New Jersey courts did not have personal jurisdiction 
over defendant).  
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harder, and in some cases impossible, for plaintiffs to find available 
courts.7 Disputes where personal jurisdiction was once so well 
established that no defendant raised the issue would be barred today.8 
Under the Court’s new approach, historically significant cases could no 
longer be brought in any U.S. court.9 Some scholars have gone so far as 
                                                                                                                     
 7. The actions commenced against the foreign corporations in J. McIntyre, Daimler, and 
Goodyear cannot be brought in any court in the U.S. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
Justice Sotomayor points out that actions against two corporations incorporated and headquartered 
in different states may now be impossible to bring in any single forum when the claims arise in 
different states. See Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 8. In Goodyear, Goodyear USA did not challenge general jurisdiction in North Carolina 
where it maintained major productions facilities and was qualified to do business. 564 U.S. at 921. 
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the defendant did not raise the issue of personal jurisdiction 
over itself; it was sued in Kansas where it was qualified to do business and operated numerous 
gas leases, and the class action sought recovery for identical wrongs committed in numerous 
states. 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, where the 
regional East Coast retailer and distributor successfully challenged personal jurisdiction in 
Oklahoma, the German manufacturer and the nationwide importer did not challenge personal 
jurisdiction in Oklahoma where they engaged in substantial business. 444 U.S. 286, 298–99 
(1980). General jurisdiction over the defendants in Goodyear, Shutts, and World-Wide 
Volkswagen would no longer be constitutionally permissible after Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746, and 
BNSF, 137 S. Ct. 1549, and specific jurisdiction would not be available because the claims did 
not relate to forum conduct by the defendant.  
In Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), no party and no member of the Court 
questioned personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant, but jurisdiction would be doubtful 
today. See MICHAEL VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE 56–57 (2017) (explaining that 
forum would lack general jurisdiction after Goodyear and Daimler forum was not where 
corporation was “at home”). 
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, a majority of Justices concluded that personal 
jurisdiction would be proper for claims by a California resident injured in California by a defective 
tire valve manufactured overseas that was present in California as the result of a chain of ordinary 
commercial transactions, and where it injured the plaintiff in the state. 480 U.S. 102, 117, 121 
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 122 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). However, the Court held that specific personal 
jurisdiction was unconstitutional because it was unreasonable after the plaintiff’s claims were 
dismissed, and the remaining claims were between the foreign national manufacturer and the 
foreign national component-manufacturer. Id. at 116 (majority opinion). Stream of commerce 
jurisdiction is in doubt after J. McIntyre, in which a plurality would no longer permit specific 
jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturers without additional evidence that the manufacturer 
targeted the forum state, and where concurring Justices found limited sales were insufficient. 564 
U.S. at 887 (plurality opinion); id. at 888 (Breyer J., concurring). 
 9. For example, in Holzer v. Deutsche Reichgsbahn-Gesellschaft, the New York courts 
obtained quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the German national railroad in a lawsuit challenging the 
railroad’s implementation of Nazi-era laws. 159 N.Y.S. 181, 183–84 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1936). 
Because the claims did not arise from or relate to the defendant’s forum conduct, it would not be 
subject to personal jurisdiction; and, despite the volume of the corporation’s business in New 
York, it would not be subject to general jurisdiction after BNSF, because the corporation was not 
incorporated or headquartered in New York. 137 S. Ct. at 1560. 
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to read the opinions as evidence of the Court’s willingness to invalidate 
the most familiar and traditional forms of personal jurisdiction.10 
The recent restrictions of personal jurisdiction have been celebrated 
and criticized.11 Commentators, including the defense bar, have not been 
reluctant to recognize the holdings collectively as marking a radical break 
with the Court’s prior decision.12 Just as courts and scholars once 
described changes introduced by International Shoe Co. v. Washington13 
as a “revolution,”14 commentators have labeled the Court’s legal turn 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 247, 
298 (2014) (“If the constitutional test for general jurisdiction is ‘essentially at home,’ transient 
jurisdiction cannot stand.”); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and 
the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1413–14 (2015) (questioning continuing 
validity of jurisdiction based on service on registered agent). 
 11. See generally Businesses Come Out on Top in Current Supreme Court Term, INS. J. 
(June 21, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/06/21/455250.htm 
(describing pro-business outcome of cases); Edwin Chemerinsky, Two End-of-Term Decisions 
Close the Courthouse Doors to Those Who Have Been Injured, A.B.A. J. (July 6, 2017), 
www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_again_closing_the_courthouse_doors (“The 
court has again effectively closed the courthouse door to those who have been injured.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Manufacturers in Support of 
Petitioner at 7, BNSF, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (No. 16-405) (“In the past few years, the Court set forth 
the ‘at home’ standard for general jurisdiction . . . . This standard provides a clear and demanding 
test . . . . This high bar is needed . . . .”); M. Derek Harris, U.S. Supreme Court Shifts Basic 
Personal Jurisdiction Rules, A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/082211-supreme-court-personal-jurisdiction.html (“In [2011], 
the Court rejected a quarter century old notion that placement of products in the ‘stream of 
commerce’ can subject foreign manufacturers to personal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
A client newsletter by a large defense-oriented firm characterizes even the unanimous 
decision in Walden v. Fiore as marking a “curtail[ment] of plaintiffs’ freedom to select the forum 
of litigation.” STEPHEN A. KINAIRD ET AL., “Minimum Contacts” Inquiry Cannot Be Minimal: The 
Supreme Court Rejects Broad Reading of the Effects Test for Personal Jurisdiction, STAY 
CURRENT: CLIENT ALERT FROM PAUL HASTINGS at 1 (2014), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/ 
default-source/PDFs/stay-current--minimum-contacts-inquiry-cannot-be-minimal-u-s-supreme-
court-rejects-broad-reading-of-the-effects-test-for-personal-jurisdiction.pdf. 
 13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 14. Fifteen cases and over one hundred articles describe changes to personal jurisdiction 
after 1945 as a “revolution” or “revolutionary.” (Westlaw search “revolution! /10 ‘international 
shoe’ or ‘personal jurisdiction’”); e.g., Crosson v. Conlee, 745 F.2d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(referring to “the revolution in personal jurisdiction wrought by the Supreme Court’s enunciation 
of the ‘minimum contacts’ [standard]”); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 372 
(D. Md. 1975) (“[International Shoe] worked its revolution on the due process requirements for 
asserting personal jurisdiction.”); McCrory Corp. v. Girard Rubber Corp., 56 Erie C.L.J. 1, 3 (C.P. 
Pa. 1973) (“International Shoe . . . revolutionized the ‘doing business’ concept . . . .”); James S. 
Cochran, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. 
L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1986) (footnote omitted) (“The theory of personal jurisdiction has undergone 
revolutionary change over the last four decades.”). The trope first appeared in 1969. See Fraley v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 294 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (referring to Judge Hand 
attributing “revolutionary scope to the International Shoe case”); Note, Jurisdiction in New York: 
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since 2011 a “revolution” in personal jurisdiction.15 
This Article explores one striking paradox of the Roberts Court’s 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence: In explaining decisions that alter the 
fundamental power of courts, members of the Court repeatedly deny that 
they are altering existing law. On the contrary, they insist that the Court’s 
holdings are controlled by long-settled legal principles.16 Focusing on the 
most recent decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court 
(BMS),17 this Article critically examines the Court’s practice of 
explaining its holdings as narrowly dictated by controlling precedent.18 
Part II describes the case history and discusses the problem facing the 
lower courts and the reasons offered by the lower courts in finding 
personal jurisdiction. It then turns to the Supreme Court’s decision, 
considering the explanation offered by Supreme Court Justice Samuel 
Alito in his opinion for the Court and the concerns raised by Justice 
Sotomayor in her dissenting opinion. Finally, this Part contemplates a 
series of mysteries—elements of the decision that remain unexplained by 
the reasoning offered by the majority opinion. The Conclusion treats the 
opinion in BMS in the context of the Court’s pattern of denying that it is 
making significant changes to the law of personal jurisdiction. It argues 
that the Court’s claims that the outcome of its decision is determined by 
                                                                                                                     
A Proposed Reform, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1417 (1969) (referring to “revolution wrought by 
International Shoe”). Earlier descriptions were more restrained. E.g., Note, Extending In 
Personam Jurisdiction by Enforcing State “Blue Sky” Laws Against Nonresidents, 59 YALE L.J. 
360, 366 (1950) (“Actually, the holding in International Shoe was not a radical departure from 
prior cases—it merely discarded the fictions of corporate ‘presence’. . . .”). The title of the present 
Article pays homage to Michael E. Solimine’s Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. 
L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 15. The Roberts Court’s transformation of personal jurisdiction law has been referred to as 
a revolution even by defenders of the new doctrines. See, e.g., William Grayson Lambert, The 
Necessary Narrowing of Personal Jurisdiction, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 375, 427 (2016) (referring to 
Goodyear as inaugurating “a revolution of personal jurisdiction”). Perhaps the more appropriate 
trope is counterrevolution, to the extent that it cuts back on jurisdiction that was facilitated by 
earlier changes and is part of a broader procedural movement to alter the law. See VITIELLO, supra 
note 8, at 57 (describing approach of Court as “dramatic departure from a significant body of case 
law”). 
 16. On the Court, only Justice Sotomayor has called attention to the Court’s radical 
transformation of the law of personal jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In a fourth case, restricting 
stream-of-commerce jurisdiction, three Justices dissented. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893, 909 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Kagan & Sotomayor, 
J.J.) (providing appendix documenting widespread judicial acceptance of view rejected by Court). 
 17. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 18. In Bristol-Myers III, Justice Alito also (twice) referred to the decision as narrowly 
governed by “settled principles.” Id. at 1781, 1783; see also infra notes 113, 126 and 
accompanying text (quoting and discussing language of opinion). 
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precedent obscures the state of legal uncertainty for which the Court itself 
is largely responsible. Additionally, it argues that the Court’s explanation 
fosters a narrative of lower court intransigence that devalues the 
contributions of lower court judges and erodes confidence in the courts. 
It ends by identifying practical and theoretical costs to law reform by 
stealth. 
This Article argues that by means of the stealth revolution, the Court 
is implementing radical law reform without the hard work of constructing 
persuasive explanations that ground a new vision of personal jurisdiction 
in firm constitutional principle and appropriate social policy analysis. 
This Article contends that there are better ways to effect constitutional 
change.19 The Court should openly acknowledge that it is altering the law 
of personal jurisdiction, explain why new constitutional restrictions on 
the power of courts serve current social needs,20 and relate its new 
approach to the history and purpose of the Due Process Clause, or perhaps 
find other suitable authority. Alternatively, the Court should slow the 
revolution, conform its personal jurisdiction decisions more closely to 
prior decisions under International Shoe, and leave future generations to 
ponder the motivations behind the Court’s recent restrictions on personal 
jurisdiction.21 
I.  POLICING SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION: BRISTOL-MYERS 
SQUIBB CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT 
A.  Background 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) is a pharmaceutical company, 
incorporated in Delaware, with its headquarters in New York and 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. McIntyre, see infra Section II.A, and Justice 
Werdegar’s dissenting opinion below in Bristol-Myers II, see infra Subsection I.B.2.b, provide 
models of alternative explanations for reforming the law of personal jurisdiction that do not rely 
solely on tendentious use of precedent. 
 20. Over the years, judges and scholars alike have questioned whether the Due Process 
Clause provides appropriate constitutional authority for limits on personal jurisdiction. See Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324–25 (1945) (Black, J., separate opinion) (“I believe 
the Federal Constitution leaves to each State . . . a power . . . to open the doors of its courts for its 
citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business in those States. . . . [I]t [is] a judicial 
deprivation to condition [the] exercise [of the state’s power] upon this Court’s notion of ‘fair 
play’ . . . [or convenience].”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Alan B. Morrison in Support of 
Respondents at 4, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (“The Court should no longer use the Due 
Process Clause to determine the constitutionality of . . . assertions of personal jurisdiction.”); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Alan B. Morrison in Support of Respondents, supra, at 4, 6 (urging Court 
instead to impose limits under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 21. Justice Sotomayor’s separate opinions advocate this approach. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers 
III, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Additionally, the author of this Article has 
written in support of it. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 167. 
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“substantial operations” in New York and New Jersey.22 BMS engages 
in commercial activities around the country, including in California 
where it operates five research and laboratory facilities that employ 160 
people.23 It employs another 250 sales representatives in California and 
maintains a political advocacy office in the state capital.24 
By the early 2000s, Plavix (a brand name for clopidogrel) was BMS’s 
bestselling product, and before the expiration of its patent, the second 
bestselling drug in the world with revenue on U.S. sales exceeding $9 
billion in 2009.25 BMS actively sold the product in California.26 
“Between 2006 and 2012, it sold almost 187 million Plavix pills in the 
State and took in more than $900 million from those sales.”27 Sales of the 
product in California constituted over one percent of BMS’s total sales.28 
Moreover, McKesson Corporation, headquartered in California, served 
as a major nationwide distributor of Plavix.29 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1777–78. The opinion identified the state of 
incorporation, the state where it maintained headquarters, and the two states where it conducted 
“substantial operations.” This allowed the Court to avoid specifying which specific state was its 
principal place of business for purposes of determining where the corporation is “at home” for 
purposes of general jurisdiction. The appropriate test is uncertain. See Hoffheimer, supra note 5, 
at 596–99. The opinion of the Supreme Court of California explained that BMS employed 
“approximately 6,475 employees in the New York and New Jersey area, comprising 51 percent 
of its United States workforce.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-Myers II), 
377 P.3d 874, 879 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 23. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 24. Id. 
 25. E.J. Topol & N.J. Schork, Catapulting Clopidogrel Pharmacogenomics Forward, 17 
NATURE MED. 40, 40 (2011). 
 26.  Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (citing Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 879). 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 879). Plaintiff’s counsel argued that this number 
underestimated the sales. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 32–33. 
 29. The lawsuits also named as defendant McKesson Corporation. McKesson is 
headquartered in San Francisco and had an ongoing commercial relationship with BMS involving 
distribution of BMS products around the country. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 900. The Court of 
Appeals opinion identifies Delaware as McKesson’s place of incorporation. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-Myers I), 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (opinion 
by Brick, J., for unanimous court), aff’d, 377 P.3d 879 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). But 
the plaintiffs did not allege and could not prove that McKesson distributed the Plavix that caused 
the nonresidents injuries outside California, nor provide evidence that McKesson distributed 
Plavix, and plaintiffs’ counsel conceded during oral argument before the state court that “he had 
no evidence tying McKesson to the Plavix that allegedly injured real parties outside [California].” 
Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 895, 900 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). The opinions did not describe 
the volume of products distributed nationally by McKesson, but plaintiffs’ counsel claimed 
McKesson distributed 700,000 Plavix pills per week outside California. Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 1, at 32–33 (statement of plaintiffs’ counsel, Goldstein). 
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In 2005, an article raised concerns about the drug’s safety.30 In eight 
separate complaints filed in California state courts, a total of 678 
plaintiffs asserted claims in California state courts against BMS and 
McKesson.31 The plaintiffs resided all over the country with the largest 
groups in Texas (92), California (86), and Ohio (71).32 Most of the 
plaintiffs (592) were neither residents of California, nor alleged that their 
claims arose directly from acts performed in California.33 The claims all 
raised the same thirteen causes of action under California state law34 and 
were consolidated.35  
                                                                                                                     
 30. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (referring to 2005 
publication of article in New England Journal of Medicine). See generally F.K. Chan et al., 
Clopidogrel Versus Aspirin and Esomeprazole to Prevent Recurrent Ulcer Bleeding, 352 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 238 (2005) (raising concerns about the safety of the drug) (not cited by any opinion 
or brief). 
 31. The plaintiffs may have joined McKesson for the purpose of preventing removal. 
Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 900 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (noting BMS suggestion of possible 
motive for joining co-defendant). BMS removed some of the claims to federal court but they were 
remanded. See Bristol-Myers I, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 416. 
 32. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 878. This Article follows the practice of the opinions in 
referring to plaintiffs alleging injuries in California as California residents and to plaintiffs 
alleging injuries elsewhere as nonresidents. As Justice Sotomayor noted, this was a convenient 
shorthand (which she followed) and that “[f]or jurisdictional purposes, the important question is 
generally (as it is here) where a plaintiff was injured, not where he or she resides.” Bristol-Myers 
III, 137 S. Ct. at 1785 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 33. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 878. 
 34. Id. at 878 (listing theories of strict products liability based on defective design and 
manufacturing, negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, deceit by concealment, 
negligent misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, unfair competition, false advertising, and loss 
of consortium). Remedies sought included injunctive relief (for false advertising) and damages 
for a variety of injuries (internal bleeding, heart attack, stroke, and death). Id. Eighteen of the 
claims alleged Plavix caused death. Id. 
The majority opinion emphasizes that “[a]ll the complaints asserted 13 claims under 
California law.” Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (citing Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 878). 
According to plaintiffs’ counsel, most of the plaintiffs’ claims were not California statutory causes 
of action, and where they were, they were similar to common law claims. Brief of Respondents 
at 6–7 n.3, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466). 
The case did not address what law would govern the claims, but there is no reason to suspect 
that California courts would have applied California law to the nonresidents’ claims. See generally 
Michael H. Hoffheimer, California’s Territorial Turn in Choice of Law, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 
167 (2015) (discussing strong trend in California decisions to apply law of state where injury was 
sustained). 
 35. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 878 (observing that separate actions were assigned to 
single judge as coordinated matter). 
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B.  State Court Proceedings 
The California trial court refused to quash service of process.36 The 
California Court of Appeal affirmed.37 While the appellate court 
concluded that California did not have general jurisdiction under the 
facts,38 it found that the trial court could exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction over all claims.39 The California Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
 36. California statutes authorize personal jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with 
the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” CAL. CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (2017), quoted in 
Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 879. The trial court concluded from principles that were well 
established prior to Daimler that sales, a permanent business presence, and related activities were 
sufficient to support general jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 878. BMS also maintained 
a registered agent in California. Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, at 5. But this fact was 
evidently not relied on by the California courts. 
 37. Bristol-Myers I, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (opinion by Brick, J., 
for unanimous court), aff’d, 377 P.3d 879 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 38. Id. at 424. The Court of Appeal had earlier denied the writ of mandate on the same day 
the Supreme Court announced Daimler AG v. Bauman. Id. at 415. The state high court directed it 
to reconsider in light of Daimler, and the Court of Appeal subsequently found no general 
jurisdiction. Id. at 418–24; see also Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 879 (stating that the Court of 
Appeal held that BMS’s activities in California were insufficient to subject it to general 
jurisdiction in the state). The Court of Appeal observed how Daimler significantly clarified the 
scope of the “at home” requirement announced in Goodyear. Bristol-Myers I, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 422 (citation omitted) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 923, 929 (2011) (“[A] further contouring of the law of general jurisdiction was by no means 
obvious from the Goodyear decision. This was especially true in light of the Goodyear court’s 
observation that ‘[t]he canonical opinion in this area remains’ International Shoe . . . and 
[Goodyear’s] own quoting of the traditional [continuous and systematic general business contacts] 
standard for general jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 39. Judge Brick noted that nothing in Daimler suggested a restriction of specific personal 
jurisdiction, and he observed that finding specific personal jurisdiction required an analysis of (1) 
whether the defendant purposefully directed activities at the forum state; (2) whether plaintiff’s 
claims arise out of or are related to the activities; and (3) whether jurisdiction is reasonable. 
Bristol-Myers I, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 425. Judge Brick relied on California authority that a 
“substantial nexus or connection” between the claims and defendant’s forum conduct is required 
for specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 430 (quoting Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 
1085, 1099 (Cal. 1996)). He found that the volume and character of BMS’s sales and other activity 
established more than minimum contacts and that the nonresident plaintiffs’ injuries resulted from 
a common interstate marketing effort that established a substantial connection between BMS’s 
contacts in California and the nonresidents’ claims. Id. at 433–34. Judge Brick also proceeded to 
consider the issue of reasonableness and found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BMS 
was reasonable. Id. at 436–39. 
Finally, Judge Brick separately considered the theory of pendent personal jurisdiction. He 
concluded that the doctrine, deriving from federal practice, did not apply because the claims were 
asserted by different plaintiffs; he nevertheless found that the policy behind the doctrine supported 
jurisdiction. Id. at 439 (“While pendent personal jurisdiction has no application to the issues 
before us, the policy behind it of encouraging judicial economy, avoiding piecemeal litigation, 
and encouraging convenience of the parties applies here with equal force.”); see also Action 
Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (permitting 
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acknowledged the divergent criteria for general and specific personal 
jurisdiction.40 California Supreme Court Chief Justice Tani Cantil-
Sakauye’s opinion for the majority found for general personal 
jurisdiction, and that specific personal jurisdiction was proper over the 
nonresidents’ claims.41 Three members of the court dissented, concluding 
that neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction was proper over the 
nonresidents’ claims.42 
1.  General Jurisdiction 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye discussed the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on general jurisdiction43 and acknowledged that the Court in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown44 and Daimler AG v. 
Bauman45 “significantly elaborated upon its analysis of general 
jurisdiction, clarifying that in order to support the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over a corporation its contacts with the forum state must be 
so extensive as to render the company essentially ‘at home’ in the state.”46  
The Chief Justice then reviewed the facts in Goodyear and Daimler,47 
noted Daimler’s comparison of in-state and out-of-state contacts,48 and 
reasoned that general jurisdiction was not available outside of the places 
of incorporation and principal place of business except under “truly 
‘exceptional facts.’”49 Applying the at-home standard, she concluded that 
general jurisdiction was not available over BMS.50 The Chief Justice also 
                                                                                                                     
personal jurisdiction over defendant for state-law claims over which federal court has 
supplemental subject matter jurisdiction). 
 40. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 880–81, 885. 
 41. Id. at 889. 
 42. Id. at 894, 909 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 880–84 (majority opinion) (discussing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014); Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). 
 44. 564 U.S. 915. 
 45. 134 S. Ct. 746. 
 46. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 881 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751, and Goodyear, 
564 U.S. at 919–20). 
 47. Id. at 883. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 883–84 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19) (“BMS is not subject to the 
general jurisdiction of the California courts.”). 
 50.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye concluded: 
The United States Supreme Court’s at home rule for general jurisdiction over 
a corporation . . . defeats the nonresident plaintiffs’ claim that California may 
assert general jurisdiction over BMS. BMS may be regarded as being at home in 
Delaware, where it is incorporated, or perhaps in New York and New Jersey, 
where it maintains its principal business centers. Although the company’s 
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considered and rejected the argument that the service on the corporation’s 
registered agent in California established a basis for general 
jurisdiction.51 
2.  Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
a.  Majority 
In contrast to general jurisdiction, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye noted 
that the determining specific jurisdiction inquiry requires an analysis of 
“the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”52 
For this, she applied a three-part test that required consideration of (1) 
“whether the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ its activities at the 
forum state;”53 (2) “whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or are 
related to these forum-directed activities;”54 and (3) “whether the exercise 
is reasonable and does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”55 
First, the Chief Justice found that the defendant purposely directed 
activities at California.56 She explained that the liberty interest protected 
by the Due Process Clause requires some relationship between the 
defendant and the forum state so that the defendant has notice that it may 
be subject to the forum court’s jurisdiction.57 Such activities “cannot be 
the result of the unilateral actions of another party or a third person.”58 
She illustrated this requirement with the example of a case in which a 
Nevada hotel was found to have directed acts at California when it had 
advertised heavily in California and targeted California customers.59 
                                                                                                                     
ongoing activities in California are substantial, they fall far short of establishing 
that is it [sic] at home in this state for purposes of general jurisdiction. 
Id. at 883. 
 51. Id. at 884 (“[A] corporation’s appointment of an agent for service of process, when 
required by state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction for disputes unrelated to 
its California transactions.”); see also id. (quoting Thomson v. Anderson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 
268 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)) (“[D]esignation of an agent for service of process and qualification to 
do business in California alone are insufficient to permit general jurisdiction.”). 
 52. Id. at 885 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
414 (1984)). 
 53. Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). 
 54. Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). 
 55. Id. at 885 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)). 
 56. Id. at 886.  
 57. Id. at 885–86 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985)). 
 58. Id. at 886 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). 
 59. Id. (“In doing so, [the hotel] necessarily availed [itself] of the benefits of doing business 
in California and could reasonably expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of courts in California.” 
(quoting Snowney v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 112 P.3d 28, 31 (Cal. 2005)). 
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Given BMS’s marketing activity, sales, and operations in California, she 
found that the corporation purposely directed acts at the forum state.60 
Second, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye concluded that the litigation 
arose out of or was related to BMS’s contacts in California.61 Although 
the nonresident claims did not arise out of BMS’s marketing or other acts 
directed at California, she explained, “A claim need not arise directly 
from the defendant’s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to 
the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather, as long 
as the claim bears a substantial connection to the nonresident’s forum 
contacts, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate.”62 In 
determining whether the contacts established “a substantial connection,” 
California courts had applied a sliding scale approach: “[T]he more wide 
ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a 
connection between the forum contacts and the claim.”63 Applying this 
standard to BMS, she concluded that the nonresident claims against BMS 
were sufficiently related to BMS’s activity directed to California to 
support specific personal jurisdiction over those claims: 
Both the resident and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims are based 
on the same allegedly defective product and the assertedly 
misleading marketing and promotion of that product, which 
allegedly caused injuries in and outside the state. Thus, the 
nonresident plaintiffs’ claims bear a substantial connection 
to BMS’s contacts in California. BMS’s nationwide 
marketing, promotion, and distribution of Plavix created a 
substantial nexus between the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims 
and the company’s contacts in California concerning 
Plavix.64 
As she summed up, the “nonresident plaintiffs’ claims in this 
action . . . arise from the same course of conduct that gave rise to 
California Plaintiffs’ claims.”65 The Chief Justice also noted that BMS’s 
operation of research and laboratory facilities in California were related 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. (“[T]here is no question that BMS has purposely availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in California, invoking benefits and protection of its laws, and BMS does 
not contend otherwise.”). 
 61. Id. at 888 (“The California plaintiffs’ claims . . . certainly arise from BMS’s purposeful 
contacts with this state, and BMS does not deny that it can be sued for such claims in California.”). 
 62. Id. at 887 (quoting Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1096 (Cal. 1996)). 
 63. Id. at 889 (quoting Vons, 926 P.2d at 1098). 
 64. Id. at 888.  
 65. Id. at 894. 
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to the claims of negligent development of the drug, though the negligent 
development did not occur in California.66 
Third, she found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was 
reasonable.67 She considered the reasonableness factors that the Supreme 
Court had elaborated: the burden on the defendant, the interests of the 
forum state, the plaintiff’s interest in relief, the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared 
interest of the states.68 Based on these factors, she made the following 
findings: litigation in California was not unduly burdensome to the 
defendant;69 although California did not have a clearly identified interest 
in providing a forum for the nonresidents’ claims considered in 
isolation,70 personal jurisdiction would be reasonable if it served 
plaintiffs’ interest in a convenient and effective forum by filing the claims 
jointly in California;71 and shared interstate interests in efficiency and 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 888 (“[T]he fact that the company engages in research and product development 
in these California facilities is related to plaintiffs’ claims that BMS engaged in a course of 
conduct of negligent research and design that led to their injuries, even if those claims do not arise 
out of BMS’s research conduct in this state. Accordingly, BMS’s research and development 
activity in California provides an additional connection between the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims 
and the company’s activities in California.”). 
Anticipating the dissent’s objection that the nonresidents’ claims were not related to BMS’s 
conduct in California but merely constituted similar conduct, the Chief Justice wrote, the claims 
of residents and nonresidents alike were based on “a single, coordinated, nationwide course of 
conduct directed out of BMS’s New York headquarters and New Jersey operations center and 
implemented by distributors and salespersons across the country.” Id. 
 67. BMS did not contest the reasonableness of specific jurisdiction, and reasonableness 
would have been presumed after a finding that the defendant had directed acts at California and 
that the claims were sufficiently closely related to those acts. See id. at 885, 891 (discussing 
burdens under California law). Rather BMS argued that specific jurisdiction was improper due to 
the lack of a sufficient relationship between the claims and its activity in California. See id. at 
891. 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye discussed BMS’s argument that the claims neither arose from 
the defendants’ contacts in California nor were related to the defendant’s contacts in California in 
the context of her discussion of reasonableness. Id. (“[T]hese arguments are more pertinent to 
consideration of whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction is reasonable, not whether the 
contested claims arise from or relate to the company’s forum activities.”). 
 68. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) and 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 69. Id. at 892. While conceding that there was some burden in defending against the 
nonresident claims, she noted that the burden was less than the burden of defending claims in as 
many as thirty-four different state courts. Id. at 891. Discovery was available to obtain information 
from nonresident plaintiffs, and there was no evidence that the costs of litigating in California 
were higher than elsewhere. Id. at 892. 
 70. See id. (“BMS . . .  claims that California has no legitimate interest in adjudicating the 
claims of nonresidents because they have no connection to the state. Admittedly, the fact that the 
nonresident plaintiffs greatly outnumber the California plaintiffs does give us some pause.”). 
 71. Id. at 892‒93. 
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finality supported litigation of the claims in a single forum.72 
To be sure, a single court hearing the claims of hundreds of 
plaintiffs is a significant burden on that court. But the overall 
savings of time and effort to the judicial system, both in 
California and interstate, far outweigh the burdens placed on 
the individual forum court. The alternative that BMS 
proposes would result in the duplication of suits in numerous 
state or federal jurisdictions at substantial costs to both the 
judicial system and to the parties, who would have to deal 
with disparate rulings on otherwise similar procedural and 
substantive issues.73 
The Chief Justice identified two substantive legal advantages that 
would be achieved by permitting litigation to proceed in a single forum: 
consolidating claims would prevent plaintiffs who recover the first 
judgment from bankrupting the defendant and preventing other equally 
situated defendants from recovering;74 and coordinating litigation in a 
single forum could avoid inconsistent judgments and the “possible 
unfairness of punishing a defendant over and over again for the same 
tortious conduct.”75  
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye acknowledged that other states have 
sovereign interests in applying their laws to the disputes, but she noted 
that the preliminary decision as to personal jurisdiction did not prevent 
California courts from ultimately applying the substantive law of sister 
states.76  
b.  Dissent 
In her dissenting opinion, California Supreme Court Justice Kathryn 
Werdegar concluded that specific jurisdiction was constitutionally 
prohibited due to the lack of “any substantial nexus, causal or otherwise, 
between [the nonresidents’] claims and BMS’s activities in California.”77 
First, she contended that the majority decision was not supported by case 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 893. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 229 P.3d 790, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 75. Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 229 P.3d at 796). 
 76. Id. at 894. The Chief Justice concluded that the choice of law analysis should not affect 
the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. The fact that “choice-of-law concerns might very well make a mass 
tort action unmanageable” should not be “determinative at this stage of the proceedings.” Id. See 
also supra note 34 and accompanying text (observing that California courts probably would not 
apply California law to all claims). 
 77. Id. at 895 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
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law.78 Second, she argued that the majority approach eroded the 
substantial connection requirement and “impairs important functions of 
reciprocity, predictability, and limited state sovereignty served by the 
relatedness requirement.”79 Third, she found that the erosion of the 
relatedness requirement has adverse consequences, making it impossible 
for nonresident companies to predict in advance whether they will be 
subject to jurisdiction in California,80 and “extending jurisdiction over 
claims of liability well beyond [California’s] legitimate regulatory 
interest.”81 Fourth, she asserted that eroding the relatedness requirement 
“undermines an essential distinction between specific and general 
jurisdiction,” frustrating the shift that the U.S. Supreme Court 
inaugurated in Daimler to a “much tighter ‘at home’ limit.”82 
Because California has a strong interest in providing an accessible 
forum for California residents, Justice Werdegar recognized that 
considerations of efficiency might establish a valid California state 
interest in promoting joinder in cases where joining nonresident claims 
provided efficiencies that facilitated resolution of resident claims.83 But 
she was skeptical about the benefits that the majority attributed to joinder 
in BMS where the large number of resident claims already provided an 
opportunity to join smaller cases that might not have been litigated 
efficiently by themselves.84 Moreover, she noted that consolidation in 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Id. at 896 (“The majority’s decision is not supported by specific jurisdiction decisions 
from the United States Supreme Court, this court, or the lower federal and state courts.”); see also 
id. at 897–98 (“Of the post-International Shoe decisions in which the high court actually found a 
factual basis for specific jurisdiction, each featured a direct link between forum activities and the 
litigation.”); id. at 898 (“Notwithstanding our relatively broad substantial connection standard, 
mere similarity of claims is an insufficient basis for specific jurisdiction.”); id. at 900–01 
(“Neither [plaintiffs] nor the majority cites any decision, state or federal, finding specific 
jurisdiction on facts similar to those here. In fact, courts in both systems have rejected jurisdiction 
over drug defect claims made by plaintiffs who neither reside in nor were injured by conduct in 
the forum state.”). 
 79. Id. at 896. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. Justice Werdegar noted the forum state’s interest where a defendant’s forum 
activities are “legally relevant” to establish the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 899. In such a case the 
state arguably has an interest in regulating conduct in its territory. Id. Likewise a state has an 
interest in providing a forum for its residents. Id. In contrast, “California has no discernable 
sovereign interest in providing an Ohio or South Carolina resident a forum in which to seek redress 
for injuries in those states caused by conduct occurring outside California.” Id. 
 82. Id. at 896. 
 83. Id. at 904 (“On the facts of this case, there is no analogous state interest of similar force 
that would justify California courts adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims. This is not a 
case in which the individual California plaintiffs would be stymied by procedural obstacles or 
restrictive damages rules were the nonresidents excluded from the action.”). 
 84. Id. at 904 (“Even if some of the California plaintiffs might have individual claims too 
small to justify suit, the consolidation of scores of such claims from within California would 
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BMS could not achieve maximum efficiency so as to protect the 
defendant from multiple inconsistent judgments because many claims 
were not before the California courts.85 
She questioned the majority’s reliance on the in-state activity of the 
co-defendant distributor when that co-defendant’s in-state activity was 
unrelated to the nonresidents’ claims and did nothing to establish a 
relationship between BMS and the nonresident plaintiffs.86 And she 
questioned the relevance of BMS’s own in-state activity—such as its 
research operations—when that activity, too, was not related to the claims 
in litigation.87  
Finally, Justice Werdegar offered a cogent affirmative argument in 
support of a rigorous enforcement of the substantial connection 
requirement. She proposed that the requirement served important 
functions. By ensuring a meaningful relationship between the defendant’s 
activity and the claims, the requirement grounds personal jurisdiction in 
the reciprocal relationship of the defendant and the regulating state.88 The 
requirement limits the potential litigation burdens faced by defendants 
that engage in limited in-state activity,89 and reciprocity-based limits 
prevent states “from straying beyond their legitimate regulatory 
spheres”90 and allow nonresident corporations to predict in advance 
whether they will be subject to jurisdiction in forum state courts.91 
If BMS must answer in a California court for Plavix claims 
arising across the country simply because some Californians 
                                                                                                                     
remedy that insufficiency without the addition of hundreds of nonresidents’ claims. California can 
thus provide an effective forum for its residents to seek redress without joining those claims to 
similar claims by nonresidents.”). 
 85. Id. at 905 (stating “these plaintiffs do not constitute the entire universe of those claiming 
injury from Plavix—far from it” and noting that pending litigation of Plavix claims included 
multidistrict litigation in federal court in New Jersey and individual, mass, and representative 
action in a number of states); see id. at 905 n.3 (identifying pending cases). 
 86. Id. at 900 (characterizing majority’s reliance on state interest in regulating co-defendant 
McKessen as “ruddiest” of majority’s “red herrings”). 
 87. Id. at 907 (“[T]he majority notes that BMS maintains some research facilities in 
California [with no relationship to Plavix] . . . . This second ground of relatedness is both illogical 
and startling in its potential breadth . . . . Will we in the next case decide that a company may be 
sued in California for dismissing an employee in Florida because on another occasion it fired a 
different employee in California . . . ?”). 
 88. Id. (citing Lawrence W. Moore, The Relatedness Problem in Specific Jurisdiction, 37 
IDAHO L. REV. 583, 599 (2001) (“Reciprocity . . . refers to the idea that the litigation to which a 
defendant is exposed in a particular forum should bear some relationship to the benefits the 
company has sought by doing business in the state.”). 
 89. Id. at 908 (citing Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked 
in the National Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1345–46 (2005)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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have made similar claims, the link between the benefits BMS 
has sought by doing that business in the state and the 
liabilities to which it is exposed here has been severed. In the 
same way, predictability has been severely impaired, as the 
company’s potential liabilities cannot be forecast from its 
state activities.92 
Because she focused on the majority’s application of the second 
(relatedness) part of the jurisdictional analysis, Justice Werdegar did not 
address the reasonableness of exercising specific personal jurisdiction, 
observing only that “we should be restrained here [with respect to 
reasonableness] by the absence of any discernable state interest in 
adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.”93 
C.  The Supreme Court 
1.  Majority Opinion: Correcting a Spurious Error 
The only issue before the Court was specific jurisdiction over the 
nonresidents’ claims.94 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito described the 
facts, emphasizing the lack of relationship between BMS’s activity in 
California and the nonresidents’ claims.95 He described BMS as a large 
international corporation with most of its activity outside California;96 
noted that the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege they obtained Plavix 
from any California source;97 and added that BMS did not create its 
national marketing strategy for Plavix in California, or manufacture, 
distribute, or work on regulatory approval from the state.98  
Justice Alito also emphasized that the approach of the Supreme Court 
of California relaxed the required connection between claims and forum 
conduct in some situations: 
The majority [below] applied a “sliding scale approach to 
specific jurisdiction.” Under this approach, “the more wide-
ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily is 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at 909. To assure an appropriate connection between personal jurisdiction and state 
regulatory interest, she proposed that forum conduct be legally relevant in order to count in the 
jurisdictional analysis. Id. at 899. 
 93. Id. at 910. 
 94. The issue was initially presented by motions “to quash service of summons on the 
nonresidents’ claims.” Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017) (citation omitted). 
 95. Id. at 1777–78.  
 96. Id. The opinion also minimized the commercial significance of the in-state sales. Id. at 
1778 (citing Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 879) (noting that income from Plavix sold in California, 
while exceeding $900 million, comprised “a little over one percent of the company’s nationwide 
sales revenue”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. BMS engaged in all such activity either in New York or New Jersey. Id. 
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shown a connection between the forum contacts and the 
claim.” Applying this test, the majority concluded that 
“BMS’s extensive contacts with California” permitted the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction “based on a less direct 
connection between BMS’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ 
claims than might otherwise be required.”99 
He read the California court’s decision as finding this “attenuated” 
relationship established by the mere similarity of the residents’ and 
nonresidents’ legal claims.100 And he noted the objection raised by the 
dissenting justices below that the California court’s approach effectively 
expanded specific jurisdiction so that it became “indistinguishable from 
general jurisdiction.”101 
Turning to the constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction, he 
asserted that decisions since International Shoe have distinguished 
general and specific jurisdiction,102 and restricted general jurisdiction to 
an individual’s place of domicile and to places where a corporation “is 
fairly regarded as at home.”103 “Specific jurisdiction,” he insisted, “is 
very different.”104 He quoted language from prior opinions for specific 
jurisdiction where the civil action needed to arise out of or relate to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.105 He quoted Supreme Court Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s language where she distinguished general from 
specific jurisdiction and emphasized that specific personal jurisdiction 
required “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying 
controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in 
the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”106 
Justice Alito did not situate his discussion of relatedness in the context 
of fuller discussion of the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction. 
He neither adopted nor referred to the three-part test employed by the 
majority of the California Supreme Court. Instead, he mentioned general 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 1778–79 (citations omitted) (quoting Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 889). 
 100. Id. at 1779 (“This attenuated requirement was met, the majority found, because the 
claims of the nonresidents were similar in several ways to the claims of the California residents 
(as to which specific jurisdiction was uncontested).”). 
 101. Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d at 896 (Werdegar, J., dissenting)). 
 102. Id. at 1779–80. 
 103. Id. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 
924 (2011)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014)) (first citing Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985); and then citing Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). 
 106. Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919) (“For this reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is 
confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 
establishes jurisdiction.’”). 
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interests common to evaluating all forms of personal jurisdiction: (1) the 
interest of the forum state; (2) the interests of the plaintiffs; and (3) the 
interest of the defendant.107 He cautioned that the interests were not 
equivalent. “[T]he ‘primary concern’ is ‘the burden on the defendant.’”108 
For Justice Alito, ascertaining the burden on the defendant comprises 
two separate considerations. First, it “obviously requires a court to 
consider the practical problems resulting from litigating in the forum.”109 
In BMS, this consideration was not determinative because the defendant 
did not challenge the lower court finding that it would experience no 
practical burden in litigating the nonresidents’ claims in California.110 
Second, ascertaining the burden on the defendant also involves a 
consideration of intangible principles of federalism because the burden to 
the defendant “encompasses the more abstract matter of submitting to the 
coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the 
claims in question.”111 As he explained, “restrictions on personal 
jurisdiction ‘are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or 
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States.’”112 
After elaborating the general considerations, however, Justice Alito 
did not further explain how they affected the evaluation of personal 
jurisdiction in the case. Instead, he announced that “[o]ur settled 
principles regarding specific jurisdiction control this case.”113 Repeating 
that specific jurisdiction requires a relationship between claims and 
forum conduct, he concluded, “[f]or this reason, the California Supreme 
Court’s ‘sliding scale approach’ is difficult to square with our 
precedents.”114 The sliding-scale approach reduced the requisite strength 
of a relationship where the volume of in-state activity was great. Justice 
Alito declared, “Our cases provide no support for this approach, which 
resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”115 
Justice Alito explains what is missing: “What is needed—and what is 
missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 1780 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 
 113. Id. at 1781. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. Justice Alito bolstered the conclusion that general connections are not enough for 
specific jurisdiction by quoting language from previous opinions that even “continuous activity 
of some sorts within a state . . . is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be 
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927 (2011)). 
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at issue.”116 Justice Alito was clearly alarmed by the “danger” of a loose 
relatedness requirement,117 but he does not identify the precise adverse 
consequences of the sliding-scale approach. In holding that the case was 
resolved by precedent, he avoids explaining what purpose the relatedness 
requirement serves and what additional facts would satisfy the 
relatedness requirement. 
Instead, he rejects specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
with respect to the nonresidents’ claims as an elementary error because 
he sees jurisdiction as based exclusively on contacts or activity by parties 
other than the defendant.118 “As we have explained, ‘a defendant’s 
relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis 
for jurisdiction.’”119 
By relying on precedent that prohibits attributing contacts to 
defendants through other parties, Justice Alito avoided announcing a new 
rule of decision. He did not state that all claims must directly arise from 
the defendant’s forum activity to support specific personal jurisdiction,120 
though his separate analysis of the nonresidents’ claims might support 
such a requirement. As he saw the facts, “all the conduct giving rise to 
the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere. It follows that the California 
courts cannot claim specific jurisdiction.”121 
While avoiding announcing a new rule of decision, Justice Alito 
repurposed old lines of authority in applying them to the facts in BMS. 
No decisions by the Supreme Court had addressed the unique problem 
presented where plaintiffs joined their claims against a defendant who 
was concededly subject to personal jurisdiction based on its own forum 
conduct for other closely related claims that were the result of a 
nationwide marketing effort. He consulted no lower court opinions, but 
instead discussed two of the Court’s decisions that plaintiffs’ argument 
supported a broader construction of the relatedness requirement.122 He 
dismissed the arguments because the authorities failed to address the 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Id. 
 117. He refers to “the danger of the California approach” in finding specific jurisdiction 
“without identifying any adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’ claims.” Id. He 
rejects as “sufficient—or even relevant” BMS’s in-state research unrelated to Plavix. Id. 
 118. Id. (citing and discussing Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014)). 
 119. Id. (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct at 1123). Justice Alito added, “This remains true even 
when third parties (here, the plaintiffs who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those 
brought by the nonresidents.” Id. 
 120. Justice Sotomayor points out that the Court’s decision did not require that the plaintiffs’ 
claims arise from the defendant’s forum conduct. Id. at 1788 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that BMS had urged Court to adopt arising-out-of requirement but that the majority 
decision did not expressly endorse it, and  the question “await[s] another case”). 
 121. Id. at 1782 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id.   
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issue of relatedness in the context of specific personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant.123 
He also dismissed the “last ditch contention”124 that jurisdiction was 
supported by BMS’s arrangement with a California company to distribute 
Plavix nationally; he regarded the argument as flawed because plaintiffs 
did not allege that BMS engaged in “relevant acts” with the distributor in 
California and could not otherwise show that any of the injurious product 
consumed by the nonresidents plaintiffs in other states was distributed by 
the California distributor.125 
Justice Alito closed his opinion by repeating the message that the 
outcome was governed by the “straightforward application . . . of settled 
principles of personal jurisdiction.”126 He expressed no sympathy for the 
potential hardship on plaintiffs; He characterized plaintiffs’ concerns as 
a “parade of horribles”127 and emphasized that nothing in the Court’s 
opinion prevents residents and nonresidents from bringing joint claims in 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 1782–83. Justice Alito distinguished Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., where the 
nonresident plaintiff brought a defamation action in New Hampshire. Id. at 1782 (citing Keeton 
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)). The forum state plainly had jurisdiction over 
plaintiff’s claims arising from in-state publication, but the Supreme Court held that she could also 
assert claims for damages in all other states under the single publication rule. Id. (citing Keeton, 
465 U.S. at 774)). Justice Alito explained: 
[Keeton] concerned jurisdiction to determine the scope of a claim involving in-
state injury and injury to a resident of the State, not, as in this case, jurisdiction 
to entertain claims involving no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the 
forum State. Keeton held that there was jurisdiction in New Hampshire to 
consider the full measure of the plaintiff’s claim, but whether she could actually 
recover out-of-state damages was a merits question governed by New Hampshire 
libel law.  
Id. (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 778 n.5). But cf. BMW of N. A. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) 
(holding that computation of punitive damages under state law standard that permits considering 
wrongdoing in other state violates due process). 
Justice Alito also distinguished Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts on the ground that the 
decision addressed the due process rights of plaintiffs, not defendants. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. 
Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding in 
part that requiring nonresident plaintiffs whose claims did not arise in state to opt out of plaintiff 
class did not violate absent class members’ due process rights)) (“Since Shutts concerned the due 
process rights of plaintiffs, it has no bearing on the question presented here.”) 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/1
2018] THE STEALTH REVOLUTION IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION 521 
 
 
a defendant’s home state, nor does the opinion prevent nonresident 
plaintiffs from bringing their claims in their own home states.128 
2.  Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent: A Voice in the Wilderness 
Dissenting, Justice Sotomayor repeatedly emphasized the undisputed 
jurisdiction over BMS for some claims, and thus focused on the question 
of whether BMS should also be subject to the additional, identical claims 
of nonresidents.129 She called attention to the nationwide character of 
BMS’s marketing and distribution of Plavix, and noted the economic 
significance of BMS’s relationship with the California-based 
distributor.130  
Her summary of the history of personal jurisdiction differed from the 
majority’s. While she agreed that International Shoe was the 
“pathmarking opinion,”131 where Justice Alito looked to that case for the 
source of the categorical distinction between specific and general 
jurisdiction, she found the emergence distinction in later cases.132 Her 
opinion opened by acknowledging that the Court’s recent decisions had 
“imposed substantial curbs on the exercise of general jurisdiction.”133 
And the reduced opportunities for general jurisdiction framed her 
discussion of specific jurisdiction. 
Unlike the majority, she employed the three-part test for personal 
jurisdiction applied by the California courts.134 First, the defendant must 
purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 
forum state or purposefully direct conduct into the forum state.135 Second, 
“the plaintiff’s claim must ‘arise out of or relate to’ the defendant’s forum 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. Justice Alito expressly left open the question of whether the due process limits 
applicable to the states would apply equally to federal courts. Id. at 1784 (citing Omni Capital 
Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987)). 
 129. Id. at 1785 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The question is whether [BMS] is subject to 
suit in California only on the residents’ claims, or whether a state court may also hear the 
nonresidents’ ‘identical’ claims.”). 
 130. The dissenting opinion points out that “during the relevant time period, McKesson was 
responsible for almost a quarter of [BMS’s] revenue worldwide.” Id. at 1784. 
 131. Id. 
 132. She wrote with greater historical precision that the Court had categorically distinguished 
the two forms of jurisdiction only “for decades.” Id. at 1785 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). 
 133. Id. (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)). 
 134. See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.  
 135. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1785 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011) (plurality opinion)). 
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conduct.”136 And third, “the exercise must be reasonable under the 
circumstances.”137 
The first and third parts of the test were not in dispute.138 Like all the 
lower courts, she found that BMS’s conduct satisfied the second part, the 
relatedness requirement.139 For Justice Sotomayor, the relatedness 
requirement was never designed to police the borders of specific and 
general jurisdiction, but rather to require some connection of the claim 
with the defendant’s forum conduct—thus preventing jurisdiction where 
claims were entirely unrelated.140 She found the relatedness requirement 
satisfied without further scrutiny of the California elaboration of the 
substantial connection requirement because the nonresidents’ claims 
against BMS “concern conduct materially identical to acts the company 
took in California: its marketing and distribution of Plavix, which it 
undertook on a nationwide basis in all 50 States.”141 The fact that claims 
arose in many other states in no way prevented them from relating to the 
advertising and distribution efforts BMS made in California,142 and she 
would require nothing more than that the plaintiffs allege that they were 
injured “by the same essential acts.”143 
Justice Sotomayor denied Justice Alito’s claim that precedent 
compelled a tighter connection.144 She read the same cases as “point[ing] 
in the other direction.”145 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Id. at 1786 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). 
 137. Id. (first citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985); and then 
citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987)); see also id. (“The 
factors relevant to such an analysis [of reasonableness under the third part of the test] include ‘the 
burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.’” (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 
477)). 
 138. Id. at 1787. 
 139. Id.   
 140. As an example of an unrelated claim that would not qualify for specific jurisdiction, she 
describes a lawsuit in California for personal injuries suffered in New York due to a corporation’s 
negligent maintenance of the sidewalk outside its New York headquarters. Id. at 1786. “But 
respondents’ claims against [BMS] look nothing like such a claim.” Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.   
 143. Id. This is because the relatedness requirement is easily satisfied for Justice Sotomayor. 
She proceeds to consider the third requirement and shows that the exercise of jurisdiction would 
not be unreasonable. Id. at 1786–87. In contrast, she concluded that personal jurisdiction was 
unreasonable under the facts in Daimler AG v. Bauman. 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
 144. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id.; see also id. (“[O]ur precedents do not require this result, and common sense says 
that it cannot be correct.”). She argued that the majority misapplied the holding of Walden v. Fiore 
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Because the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BMS would not be 
burdensome in any practical way, Justice Alito had relied on the abstract 
federalism values served by the Due Process Clause.146 Justice 
Sotomayor observed, “The majority’s animating concern, in the end, 
appears to be federalism . . . . Indeed the majority appears to concede that 
this is not, at bottom, a case about fairness but instead a case about 
power . . . .”147 She responded that the restrictions on personal 
jurisdiction that linked to territorial authority of states was designed to 
safeguard the exclusive power of states only when they had the sole 
legitimate interest in adjudicating a dispute and questioned the relevance 
of federalism safeguards when the defendant was a large corporation 
being sued for simultaneous acts in many states.148 
In closing, Justice Sotomayor lamented the practical consequences of 
the majority’s approach. What Justice Alito characterized as a “parade of 
horribles,”149 she saw as real problems: “[T]he Court’s opinion in this 
case will make it profoundly difficult for plaintiffs who are injured in 
different States by a defendant’s nationwide course of conduct to sue that 
defendant in a single, consolidated action.”150 She saw no legitimate 
interest served by a tight relatedness requirement that prevented the 
consolidation of such parallel claims.151 And she observed that forcing 
the consolidation of such cases in defendant corporations’ home states 
“hands one more tool to corporate defendants determined to prevent the 
aggregation of individual claims, and forces injured plaintiffs to bear the 
burden of bringing suit in what will often be far flung jurisdictions.”152 
She notes that two types of mass tort lawsuit will no longer be possible: 
                                                                                                                     
to the question of relatedness when that decision addressed exclusively the issue of whether the 
defendant purposefully directed conduct toward the forum state. Id. (citing Walden v. Fiore, 134 
S. Ct. 1115 (2014)). And she read Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. as strong support for 
consolidating in-state and out-of-state claims. Id. at 1788 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)). While agreeing with the majority that all claims in Keeton were 
asserted by a single plaintiff and that there was no question the state court had personal jurisdiction 
over some the plaintiff’s claims, she regarded the number of plaintiffs as a “distinction without a 
difference: In either case, a defendant will face liability in a single State for a single course of 
conduct that has impact in many States. Keeton informs us that there no unfairness in such a 
result.” Id. 
 146. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text; infra Subsection II.C.4. 
 147. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. (“But I see little reason to apply such a principle in a case brought against a large 
corporate defendant arising out of its nationwide conduct. What interest could any single State 
have in adjudicating respondents’ claims that the other States do not share?”). 
 149. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Alito). 
 150. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. (“What interests are served by preventing the consolidation of claims and limiting 
the forums in which they can be consolidated?”). 
 152. Id. 
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a nationwide lawsuit against a foreign national corporation that is not “at 
home” and thus not subject to general jurisdiction in any state,153 and a 
mass action arising in multiple states against two or more corporations 
that are incorporated and headquartered in different states.154 
In broader context, she regards the new restriction on specific personal 
jurisdiction as placing real burdens on plaintiffs, burdens aggravated by 
the Court’s reduction of general jurisdiction in other cases. “Especially in 
a world in which defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in only a 
handful of States, the effect of today’s opinion will be to curtail—and in 
some cases eliminate—plaintiffs’ ability to hold corporations fully 
accountable for their nationwide conduct.”155 
D.  Mysteries of the Majority: The Road Not Taken 
This Section considers perplexing aspects of Justice Alito’s opinion 
for the Court: its failure to articulate a clear rule of decision or to explain 
policies behind the holding that indicate the scope of the decision, its 
omission of any reference to the divisions among lower courts on the 
relatedness requirement, its studious avoidance of suggesting a complete 
framework for analyzing the constitutional limits on specific personal 
jurisdiction, and its heavy reliance on an abstract sovereignty interest 
attributed to states. 
1.  The Mystery of the Scope of the Holdings 
The forceful rhetoric in Justice Alito’s opinion in BMS, in insisting 
the decision is governed by precedent, obscures the fact that the Court 
neither offers a clear rule of decision nor explains the policies that guide 
its decision. As the opinion’s treatment of prior cases makes clear, for 
civil actions in state court involving multiple plaintiffs, defendants, and 
claims, each plaintiff must independently establish valid personal 
jurisdiction over each defendant.156 But the decision leaves important 
issues unresolved. 
a.  The Standard for Relatedness 
Writing before the Court’s opinion in BMS, two scholars observed that 
the unresolved questions about the scope of specific personal jurisdiction 
included “the scope of the ‘relatedness’ requirement.”157 After the 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (citation omitted). 
 156. See id. at 1781–82 (majority opinion). 
 157. See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Business of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 790 (2017). 
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decision, prominent defense counsel explained,  
One issue left open by the decision [in BMS] is how 
much of a connection between a plaintiff’s claims and the 
forum state is required to permit the assertion of specific 
jurisdiction. The Court did not have to decide that issue 
because there was no connection at all between California 
and the claims of the non-California plaintiffs.158 
In rejecting California’s application of a sliding-scale approach to 
relatedness, Justice Alito made no effort to resolve the split among lower 
courts as to whether specific jurisdiction claims must “arise from” the 
defendant’s forum conduct.159 Indeed, though repudiating the application 
of the approach to the facts in BMS, Justice Alito emphasized that the key 
error below lay in utilizing the approach to improperly attributed contacts 
to the defendant that were established by other plaintiffs, thus leaving 
room for argument that the sliding-scale approach might constitutionally 
apply to activity by the named defendant with respect to the party 
asserting a claim.160 What the law requires, Justice Alito explains, is “a 
connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”161  
Because Justice Alito does not explain what relationship is required 
for specific jurisdiction, his opinion provides no guidance for a case 
where there is a minimal level of forum conduct that bears some 
relationship to the plaintiffs’ specific claims, but which does not directly 
give rise to those claims. For example, the opinion does not explain 
whether specific jurisdiction might have been established if BMS 
conducted one meeting in California where BMS employees discussed 
the national marketing strategy, or if BMS trained staff in California 
involved in sales to consumers in other states. The opinion’s scope is still 
less certain for cases that involve activity other than marketing. For 
example, it offers no guidance for a case where a manufacturer’s 
dangerous product was brought into a state by a third person, the product 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Andrew J. Pincus et al., Supreme Court’s Decision In Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior 
Court Rejects Expansive View of Specific Jurisdiction, CLASS DEF. BLOG: CUTTING-EDGE ISSUES 
IN CLASS ACTION L. & POL. (June 19, 2017), https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2017/06/ 
supreme-courts-decision-bristol-myers-squibb-v-superior-court-rejects-expansive-view-specific-
jurisdiction/. 
 159. See Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.  
 160. Id.   
 161. Id. The Court neither accepts nor rejects the defendant’s argument that “relate to” means 
the same thing as “arise out of.” Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 
(No. 16-466) (adopting a two-part framework for analyzing specific personal jurisdiction); see 
also id. at 17–22 (arguing that “arise out of” and “relate to” mean the same thing and require that 
the forum contacts bear a causal relationship to plaintiffs’ claims). 
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foreseeably kills a forum resident, and the manufacturer directly sells 
many identical products.162 
b.  Joinder of Claims Between a Single Plaintiff and Single Defendant 
The scope of Justice Alito’s claim-focused analysis is also uncertain. 
Does the required connection of claims to forum conduct now prevent a 
plaintiff who properly establishes personal jurisdiction over one 
defendant with respect to one claim need to separately establish personal 
jurisdiction with respect to other claims? If so, the opinion marks a radical 
break with the traditional understanding of personal jurisdiction as a 
doctrine that restricted the power of courts over parties, not claims.163 His 
focus on claims might signal that each claim must be supported by 
personal jurisdiction,164 though the opinion takes care to avoid stating a 
general rule requiring jurisdiction over each claim. 
i.  A Page of History 
During the formative period in the development of constitutional 
limits on personal jurisdiction, it was well established that states could 
exercise general jurisdiction over any defendant who appeared in its 
courts.165 Courts did not understand personal jurisdiction as a doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
 162. According to some civil procedure scholars, the causation rule advocated by BMS 
would not permit specific jurisdiction over the out-of-state car manufacturer in a case like World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, where the defective product was purchased outside the state 
and driven into the state by a nonresident, nor would it permit a resident defendant sued in the 
state to implead the manufacturer. Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors in Support 
of Respondents at 16–18, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466) (citing World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). 
 163. See Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (referring to BMS’s motion to “quash service 
of summons on the nonresidents’ claims”). 
 164. This is reinforced to the extent members of the Court distinguish Keeton on the ground 
that in Keeton some injury occurred to the plaintiff in the forum state. Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 1, at 34 (remarks of Justice Kennedy). 
 165. In York v. Texas, the plaintiff sued a Missouri resident in Texas and served the defendant 
in the state of Missouri. 137 U.S. 15, 16 (1890). The state courts conceded that “service upon the 
defendant in St. Louis was a nullity, and gave the [Texas] court no jurisdiction.” Id. at 19. But 
rather than suffering a default judgment, the defendant appeared in the Texas proceedings and 
challenged the Texas judgment in the Texas courts. Id. at 16. Under Texas law the defendant’s 
appearance waived all objections to service and jurisdiction, and the defendant raised a due-
process challenge to the failure of Texas law to provide the privilege of a special appearance—
the opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction without becoming subject to jurisdiction. Id. at 
17. The Supreme Court held that the Texas law prohibiting any defense of personal jurisdiction 
did not violate the Due Process Clause, because the defendant was not required to litigate and 
could challenge the validity of a void judgment at the time of execution. Id. at 21. 
Texas and Mississippi were unusual in not permitting special appearances. See Edson R. 
Sunderland, Preserving a Special Appearance, 9 MICH. L. REV. 396, 397 (1911). Although over 
a dozen states strictly limited the privilege of special appearance so that a defendant’s litigation 
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that was limited by claims; on the contrary, a defendant’s litigation 
presence gave the forum court the power to decide all claims against the 
defendant.166 
Only after International Shoe expanded the reach of specific personal 
jurisdiction over claims related to the forum did courts confront the need 
to limit personal jurisdiction over unrelated claims.167 Without some 
limits, courts could acquire unlimited personal jurisdiction whenever 
there were minimum contacts supporting jurisdiction over part of the 
case, and this would frustrate International Shoe’s mandate to consider 
both the level of the defendant’s activity in the forum state and the nature 
of the claims in ascertaining whether personal jurisdiction comported 
with fundamental justice.168 
The eventual judicial elaboration of the distinct categories of specific 
and general jurisdiction responded to the need to impose meaningful 
                                                                                                                     
of the merits established personal jurisdiction. Id. at 399–405 (summarizing case law). In finding 
that jurisdiction was permissible in such situations based on the de facto power of the forum court 
over persons entering an appearance, courts did not distinguish between the claims. The failure to 
provide the opportunity for special appearances was much criticized and was not followed by 
fifteen states or by federal courts. E.g., Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 479 (1878); see also 
Sunderland, supra, at 405 (discussing a federal case that declined to follow this failure and listing 
the fifteen jurisdictions that have not followed this failure). But no court held such restrictions 
were unconstitutional. 
 166. Specific jurisdiction based on litigation presence as a basis for general jurisdiction 
continues to dominate explanations of juridical power over counterclaims. See Adam v. Saenger, 
303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938) (“The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in demanding justice from 
the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or 
unreasonable in treating him as being there for all purposes for which justice to the defendant 
requires his presence.”); see also Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific 
Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1659 (2001) (discussing Court’s reasoning in Adam 
v. Saenger as providing authority for constitutionality of pendent personal jurisdiction). 
 167. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the liberal joinder of claims at the pleading 
stage, FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a), (b), and provide a model for many states, helping speed the demise 
of special appearances and their attendant restrictions on challenges to personal jurisdiction. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (permitting defense of personal jurisdiction to be joined with other defense 
without waiver of defense). The rules require the defense of personal jurisdiction to be raised 
either in a motion to dismiss or as an objection in an answer. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). The 
idea of jurisdiction based on presence in litigation survives, nevertheless, in situations where the 
court obtains jurisdiction because the defendant fails to raise the defense properly and where a 
defendant affirmatively invokes the juridical authority of the forum by serving a counterclaim. 
See generally Case Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Curing an Apparent Waiver of 
Jurisdiction Defenses: Neifeld v. Steinber, 32 MD. L. REV. 156, 158 (1972) (discussing divergent 
holdings in case law as to whether subsequent voluntary dismissal of permissive counterclaim 
restored defense of personal jurisdiction raised in answer). 
 168. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). Simard articulates this 
compelling concern in explaining why FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1) is not read literally to permit 
jurisdiction over all claims once a party is served. Simard, supra note 166, at 1646 (“Such an 
interpretation would blur the distinction between general and specific personal jurisdiction.”). 
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limits on power-based jurisdiction in an era when minimum contacts 
supported jurisdiction over one claim. Those categories also represented 
an effort to harmonize the developing case law with established 
practice.169 Finding general jurisdiction based on litigation presence 
resulting from specific personal jurisdiction would deviate wildly from 
established practice.170 
Nevertheless, even after International Shoe, courts exercised broader 
personal jurisdiction over some claims over which they did not have 
specific personal jurisdiction. Federal courts first began to apply the 
doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction in the late 1950s.171 By the 
1970s, federal courts were exercising pendent personal jurisdiction over 
related claims in a variety of contexts,172 and over time most courts found 
pendent personal jurisdiction was permissible over defendants with 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Scholars who coined the terminology of specific and general jurisdiction, in contrast to 
the courts, hoped to modify the substantive law, proposing a radical shrinking of general 
jurisdiction and an equally radical expansion of specific jurisdiction. See Arthur T. von Mehren 
& Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 
1136 (1966). See generally Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 549 n.3, 583, 585 n.210 (discussing the 
influence of von Mehren and Trautman on Justice Ginsburg). 
 170. As states extended personal jurisdiction through long-arm statutes, they were free, if 
not required, to restrict the expansion of jurisdiction that might otherwise become available over 
related claims by requiring all claims to satisfy their long-arm statute or requiring all claims to 
bear some relationship to the claims over which the forum acquired specific jurisdiction through 
the long-arm statute. E.g., Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 402 N.E.2d 122, 124 
(1980) (holding state long-arm statute established personal jurisdiction over tort claim but not 
contract claim arising from same facts). 
 171. Cochran identifies one of the earliest cases invoking pendent personal jurisdiction as 
Schwartz v. Bowman. Cochran, supra note 14, at 1468 n.22 (citing Schwartz v. Bowman, 156 F. 
Supp. 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), appeal dismissed sub nom., Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 
(2d Cir. 1959)). “By the 1970s, all the circuit courts that had considered the issue [of pendent 
personal jurisdiction] found this extension of judicial power permissible.” Id. at 1471–72 n.46 
(citing cases); see also Simard, supra note 166, at 1625–26 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases) 
(“While discussion can be found in cases dating back to the mid-1950s, the doctrine has been 
cited with increasing frequency during the last decade. The Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and 
District of Columbia Circuits have considered and applied the doctrine. Additionally, more than 
fifty decisions by United States District Courts discuss pendent personal jurisdiction, the majority 
of which uphold the application of the doctrine.”). 
 172. There were sufficient cases by 1965 to support a law review discussion. William D. 
Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 VILL. L. REV. 56, 56–59 
(1965) (discussing federal cases applying pendent personal jurisdiction). See generally Lewis D. 
Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 474 (1967) 
(discussing pendent personal jurisdiction); Lewis R. Mills, Pendent Jurisdiction and 
Extraterritorial Service Under the Federal Securities Laws, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 423 (1970) 
(discussing pendent personal jurisdiction in the context of federal securities laws). 
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respect to claims that were sufficiently closely related to other claims 
over which the court had jurisdiction.173 
In historical context, pendent personal jurisdiction was not a new 
expansion of personal jurisdiction, but rather a way of restricting general 
jurisdiction resulting from litigation presence. Most federal courts 
engaged in the practice and developed sensible guidelines. No one seems 
to have suggested that pendent personal jurisdiction was unconstitutional. 
On the contrary, a few courts observed in passing that specific personal 
jurisdiction over one claim dispenses the need to evaluate the 
constitutionality of personal jurisdiction over other claims.174 
Justice Alito’s focus on each claim leaves the status of pendent 
jurisdiction unsettled.175 Indeed, nothing in the opinion indicates that the 
claim-by-claim approach should not apply rigorously to each claim by 
each party, or at least to each claim by each plaintiff.176 As written, the 
                                                                                                                     
 173. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, at 46 (citing WRIGHT & MILLER § 1069.7)  
(arguing that most federal courts and leading treatises approve of pendent personal jurisdiction); 
see also Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 13, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466) (citing Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 243–52 (2014)) (referring to the need for pendent 
personal jurisdiction); Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, supra, at 14 (“Every circuit that has expressly considered the doctrine 
of pendent personal jurisdiction has endorsed it.”). But see Cochran, supra note 14, at 1486; 
Simard, supra note 166, at 1641–42 (discussing cases refusing to extend jurisdiction over 
additional claims). 
 174. E.g., Nat’l “Write Your Congressman” Club v. Jackson, No. 3:96-CV-1288-D, 1996 
WL 707013, at *3 (D. Tex. Dec. 4, 1996) (holding that jurisdiction over defendant with respect 
to tort claims gave the court jurisdiction over defendant for breach of contract claim); Salpoglou 
v. Widder, 899 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D. Mass. 1995) (reasoning that because court had personal 
jurisdiction over contract claim, requiring litigation over tort claim would not impose significant 
burden and would promote economy, thus satisfying state long-arm statute and Due Process 
Clause); Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (D. 
Mass. 1988) (holding that intent to have a presence in a forum is not necessary to establish 
personal jurisdiction over tortious acts); Nelson v. R. Greenspan & Co., 613 F. Supp. 342, 346 
(holding that court had sufficient jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim because it was based 
on the same core facts as a fraud claim occurring in the forum) (E.D. Mo. 1985). See generally 
Simard, supra note 166, at 1639 & n.91 (discussing cases). 
 175. The plaintiffs argued, “That doctrine [pendent personal jurisdiction] fully resolves a 
case like this one, and conversely, petitioner’s bright-line rule necessarily scuttles this fair and 
efficiency-enhancing doctrine . . . .” Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, at 46. Counsel for the 
government argued against pendent personal jurisdiction. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 1, at 5 (“We’re absolutely fighting [pendent jurisdiction].”). 
 176. Justice Alito’s opinion provides no language suggesting that the claims-based analysis 
does not apply to additional claims brought by the same party. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 
1777–85. Moreover, the manner in which Justice Alito distinguished Keeton, by insisting the out-
of-state damages arose from a single in-state claim, would be consistent with the requirement that 
each claim arise from defendant’s forum conduct. See supra note 123 and accompanying text 
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opinion leaves much uncertainty about all forms of jurisdiction over 
multiple claims between the parties, when one or more claim does not 
separately satisfy the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction. 
ii.  Unforeseen Consequences of Requiring Each Claim to Be Separately 
Supported by Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
Until BMS, no Supreme Court decision hinted that personal 
jurisdiction might be lacking over a claim asserted by a party where a 
court had valid specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on 
related claims by another party. Requiring specific jurisdiction for each 
claim by each party would have unforeseen consequences on the joinder 
of claims and on the binding effect of prior litigation. Principles of res 
judicata require a plaintiff to consolidate closely related claims in a single 
civil action against the same defendant,177 and liberal joinder rules permit 
a plaintiff to bring together all the claims he has against a single 
defendant178 and permit the liberal joinder of parties.179 Likewise, a 
defendant is required to assert against the plaintiff those counterclaims 
that are so closely related that they arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.180 The joinder rules 
also permit the defendant to assert any other counterclaim against the 
plaintiff.181 
Limits on federal court subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal 
jurisdiction, restricted the joinder of claims and parties in federal court, 
and Congress empowered federal courts to hear most closely related 
claims, provided they form part of the same constitutional case.182 
                                                                                                                     
(discussing Justice Alito’s reliance on the fact that plaintiff asserted a single cause of action but 
one that supported damages in multiple states).  
 177. Under the doctrine of merger, related claims that form part of the plaintiff’s cause of 
action merge in the litigated action and cannot be brought later. E.g., Ison v. Thomas, No. 2006–
CA–000289–MR, 2007 WL 1194374, at *1 (Ky. App. Apr. 13, 2007) (affirming ruling that 
plaintiff’s personal injury claim merged with property damage claim). 
 178. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a)–(b). 
 179. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1) (permitting joinder of plaintiffs if they assert rights arising out 
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and there are common 
questions of law or fact); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (misjoinder not a ground for dismissal). The 
court may consolidate actions for trial that involve a common question of law or fact. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 42(a)(2). A court may sever any issue or claim “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to 
expedite and economize.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 180. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
 181. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). 
 182. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Some related 
claims do not qualify for joinder under a technical reading of the statute. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 327–28 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing authority that 
federal court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaim asserted by plaintiff 
against third-party defendant impleaded by defendant). The Constitution may also prevent 
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Although the Court has not directly addressed the question of whether 
personal jurisdiction provides additional limits over properly joined 
claims, it has assumed such jurisdiction is proper in a number of contexts. 
Thus, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,183 the Court, like all parties, 
apparently assumed there was valid personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant for nonresidents’ claims arising out of activity and injury 
occurring with no relationship to the forum.184 In that case, the Court 
addressed only the issue of whether the state court had valid personal 
jurisdiction over plaintiff class members that did not opt out, and it found 
such jurisdiction was proper.185 The Court similarly found personal 
jurisdiction proper over counterclaims based on the theory that the 
plaintiff, in litigating in a forum, submitted to that forum’s personal 
jurisdiction.186 The Court did not limit the scope of counterclaims to the 
scope of the plaintiff’s original claims.187  
Requiring personal jurisdiction with respect to each claim against 
each party could leave courts powerless to decide claims that must be 
joined under the doctrine of merger or be waived, and give rise to 
unimagined, new challenges in collateral challenges regarding the partial 
validity of judgments.188 
                                                                                                                     
supplemental jurisdiction over some claims or parties. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (divesting 
federal court of subject matter jurisdiction of some claims against states by citizens of other 
states). 
 183. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 184. Id. at 814. In Shutts, the defendant did not challenge personal jurisdiction over itself. Id. 
at 799. But the Court referred to the facts that today make personal jurisdiction uncertain over 
defendants in evaluating the court’s power to bind absent class members who did not opt out. Id. 
at 813–14. Members of the Court have not been reluctant to raise sua sponte questions about 
personal jurisdiction in cases where the issue has been waived. See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 4, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (No. 10-76) (Justice 
Ginsburg opened argument by inquiring into personal jurisdiction over Goodyear USA, which 
had not challenged personal jurisdiction based on level of its commercial activity and physical 
presence in the forum state). 
 185. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 814. The meaning of the holding was actively debated in Bristol-
Myers III, and the Court later limited the broad grant of jurisdiction to members of the plaintiff 
class. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017); see supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 186. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938); see supra note 166 and accompanying 
text. 
 187. Saenger, 303 U.S. at 67–68.  
 188. The plaintiffs’ counsel argued that a tight relatedness requirement could eliminate 
personal jurisdiction in routine cases like actions probating wills and in interpleader actions where 
nonresidents can be forced to litigate in the forum despite the lack of defendant conduct in the 
forum giving rise to the claims being litigated in the forum. Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, 
at 40–41. Plaintiffs’ counsel similarly raised questions about whether permissive joinder and 
collateral estoppel would survive a constitutional rule requiring that claims arise from defendant’s 
conduct in or targeting the forum. Id. at 30–31. 
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c.  National Class Actions and the Federal Court Option 
Nothing in Justice Alito’s opinion provides a plausible ground for 
distinguishing class actions in state courts from the consolidated mass 
actions before the Court.189 Lower courts are divided over whether the 
holding applies to actions,190 but the Court’s opinion may be read as 
authority that state courts lack personal jurisdiction over class actions 
outside a defendant’s home state191 unless each plaintiff can establish 
specific personal jurisdiction over all claims.192 Such a result would be a 
departure from prior practice and would frustrate core goals of permitting 
class actions.193 Justice Alito leaves open the possibility that mass actions 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Class actions are certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or by a 
comparable state rule. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). The government emphasized that the case 
neither presented the issue of personal jurisdiction in a class action nor involved a state statute 
attempting to permit consolidation. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 32 n.5, 33–34 n.6, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466). Justice Alito’s 
opinion included no reference to such distinguishing characteristics of the litigation, suggesting, 
perhaps, that the Court found them unimportant. In contrast, Justice Sotomayor explicitly noted 
that the Court “does not confront the question whether its opinion here would also apply to a class 
action.” Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But she offered no 
suggestion for distinguishing mass actions and class actions for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 
See generally Pincus et al., supra note 158 (“[Bristol-Myers III] provides class action defendants 
with powerful arguments to challenge class actions filed in states that cannot exercise personal 
jurisdiction with respect to absent class members’ claims.”). 
 190. Compare Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-00564, 2017 
WL 4224723, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (stating “Bristol-Myers’ holding applies only to 
mass actions, not class actions,” and denying motion to dismiss out-of-state claims by nonresident 
plaintiffs), with Spratley v. FCA US LLC, No. 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348, at *7, *9 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (reasoning that Bristol-Myers III applies to class actions and dismissing 
proposed class claims by nonresident plaintiffs arising outside the state for lack of specific 
jurisdiction). 
 191. Justice Alito responded to the concerns about the elimination of forums by noting that 
actions could always be brought in the defendant’s home state. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 
1783. Justice Sotomayor pointed out, however, that no forum will be available where multiple 
corporate defendants do not share a common home state. Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); 
see supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text. Moreover, with respect to class actions, not all 
states permit class actions. See MISS. R. CIV. P. (omitting rules 23 and 23.1 governing class actions 
and shareholder derivative actions). See generally Richard T. (Flip) Phillips, Why Mississippi 
Needs a State Court Rule 23 Class Action Procedure for the 21st Century, 63 MISS. LAW. 9 (2017) 
(arguing that Mississippi should adopt a class action rule); William F. Ray, Mississippi Does Not 
Need State-Court Class Actions, 63 MISS. LAW. 16 (2017) (debating desirability of adding rule 
permitting class actions). 
 192. The Court was advised of the potential impact of the decision on class actions. See Brief 
of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 173 (arguing that petitioner’s proposed limits on specific jurisdiction would frustrate 
class action joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23). 
 193. State courts had exercised personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in 
nationwide claims without objection. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 
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and class actions barred in individual states might be constitutionally 
permissible in federal courts when the defendants engage in minimum 
contacts with the United States.194 But no federal statute or rule provides 
federal courts with personal jurisdiction over either mass or class actions 
in situations where personal jurisdiction is unavailable in state court.195 
Moreover, while commentators suggest that a federal court could 
constitutionally exercise broader personal jurisdiction than the state in 
which it sits, because the defendants’ forum contacts are evaluated in 
connection with the entire United States,196 the Court has not yet squarely 
held that this is the case. Indeed, any congressional expansion of personal 
jurisdiction to remedy the gap left by the Court’s restriction of specific 
jurisdiction in BMS would paradoxically collide with the argument raised 
                                                                                                                     
(1985). The general personal jurisdiction that supported such litigation was eliminated by the 
Court’s decisions in Goodyear and Daimler, and Justice Alito’s opinion in Bristol-Myers III 
suggests the possible elimination of specific jurisdiction. Judge (then Professor) Diane Wood 
discussed the jurisdictional facts of the class action in Shutts against the background of personal 
jurisdiction law as it existed in the 1980s. See Diane P. Wood, Adjudicator Jurisdiction and Class 
Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 612–18 (1987). At that time, most authorities assumed state courts had 
general jurisdiction. See id. at 616. But Judge Wood pointed out—decades before Goodyear—
that if general jurisdiction were limited to the few places where a corporation was “home,” then 
the defendant would not be subject to general jurisdiction elsewhere. Id. at 614–15. She also 
considered specific jurisdiction and found that it, too, might be lacking. Id. at 617–18 (“[S]pecific 
jurisdiction . . . should either exist by definition between the defendant and all class members, or 
the class itself should be of the purely representational variety.”); see also Andrews, supra note 
89, at 1321, 1373–74 (concluding that personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Shutts was 
unconstitutional, though the issue was not raised). Andrews argues more generally that state class 
actions violate defendant’s due process rights when they are brought in states where the defendant 
is not subject to general jurisdiction and where the class includes claims by plaintiffs who reside 
outside and suffered injuries outside the forum. Id. at 1314, 1348–74. 
 194. “In addition, since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes 
the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.” Bristol-Myers 
III, 137 S. Ct. at 1783–84 (citing Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 
102 n.5 (1987)). 
 195. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over nationwide class actions based on 
state law in many situations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012) (authorizing minimal diversity 
over class actions where amount in controversy exceeds $5 million); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005) (holding supplemental jurisdiction exists over 
joined claims without respect to amount in controversy where one plaintiff satisfies requirements 
for diversity jurisdiction). In contrast, the sole basis for federal court personal jurisdiction in such 
cases remains FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (limiting federal court’s personal jurisdiction to that of 
state trial court where it is sitting). For this reason, Professor Patrick Borchers proposes amending 
Rule 4(k)(2) to include cases brought in federal court on diversity of citizenship and alienage 
grounds. Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to 
(Partially) Clean up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U.  L. REV. 413, 419 (2017).  
 196. E.g., Borchers, supra note 195, at 417; see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 
U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (observing that defendant may “in principle” be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in federal court but not in any state court). 
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in BNSF that Congress lacks the authority to legislate in a manner that 
erodes rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.197  
In any event, Congress does not appear eager to provide broader 
authority for federal courts to hear mass actions or class actions. Until it 
does, the Court’s decision in BMS has the effect of removing cases from 
state courts without offering an alternative. 
2.  The Mystery of the Missing Cases 
BMS originally urged the Supreme Court to review the decision of the 
California court in order to address a division of authority among the 
lower state and federal courts about the scope of the relatedness 
requirement for specific personal jurisdiction.198 Amicus briefs urged the 
Court to grant review on the ground that the case “presents the Court with 
the opportunity to resolve a well-developed split” in the federal circuits 
and in the state supreme courts.199 
But Justice Alito’s opinion makes no reference to the decisions of the 
lower courts, despite the fact that the emerging weight of authority 
probably supported the position adopted by the Court.200 To be sure, the 
Supreme Court would not need to canvass lower court decisions in order 
to promulgate constitutional rule of decision. But where lower courts 
have been divided over important matters, the Court has not been 
reluctant to explore the source of the division in order to illustrate how 
divergent judicial solutions may be reasonably grounded in legal 
authority or policy considerations.201 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Justice McKenna found this argument persuasive. Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry., 373 P.3d 1, 13 
(Mont. 2016) (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (“Congress lacks authority to confer personal 
jurisdiction to state courts where the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
prohibit it.”), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).  
 198. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–20, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-
466) (citing cases) (“There is a deep and acknowledged split on the standard for relatedness.”). 
 199. Brief of Amicus Curiae GlaxoSmithKline, LLC in Support of Petitioner at 17, Bristol-
Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466); see also Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, 7; Bristol-Myers III, 
137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466) (referring to “persistent division of opinion in the lower courts” 
regarding the scope of the relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction). 
 200. Cf. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466) (citing the 
First Circuit) (arguing that a lower federal court had held that specific jurisdiction was not 
permissible where the plaintiff’s claims arose independently from the defendant’s forum 
contacts). 
 201. A good example is Hertz Corp. v. Friend, where the Court addressed the appropriate 
definition of a corporation’s “principal place of business,” prescribed as one of the corporation’s 
places of citizenship for purposes of diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010). The Court examined the division among the 
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Moreover, the omission of any reference to the division of authority 
deprives the opinion of juridical context. Omitting any discussion of 
divergent judicial opinions on the issue prevents the Court from 
recognizing the legal uncertainty that rendered different conclusions 
reasonable, and this in turn reinforces the impression that the California 
court’s approach was idiosyncratic and irrational—an impression that is 
not countered by any concrete discussion of the reasoning offered by the 
California courts. 
The failure to address the division of lower courts allowed Justice 
Alito to avoid acknowledging the responsibility of the Supreme Court for 
the legal uncertainty over the requirement that a case must arise from “or” 
relate to the defendant’s forum contacts—specifically whether “relate to” 
denotes a connection different from arising from.202 A significant textual 
source of lower court confusion was the Court’s opinion in Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.,203 where the Court first articulated the 
requirement for specific jurisdiction that the claim must arise from “or” 
relate to the defendants’ forum contacts.204 In articulating this 
requirement, the Court had expressly refused to decide whether “or” 
disjunctively suggested the possibility of a looser relationship than the 
causal relationship suggested by the requirement that a claim arise from 
the forum contacts.205 
It is a mystery why the Court did not discuss or even refer to the 
division of authority among the lower courts, but doing so would require 
acknowledging the source of the lower court uncertainty. And this would 
                                                                                                                     
circuits and adopted the “nerve center” test employed by some lower courts—which “should 
normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters.” Id. at 92–93. 
In contrast, the Court’s failure to acknowledge lower court authority (pro or con) in its 
discussion of personal jurisdiction may reflect unarticulated programmatic goals. Cf. Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 907 (2014) 
(discussing the Court’s treatment of lower court precedent and observing, in different context, 
that failure to identify substantial lower court authority “is worrying because it feeds the suspicion 
that the lower courts are invoked or ignored in a strategic way”). 
 202. The government argued that specific jurisdiction “ordinarily requires that some act 
giving rise to a nonresident plaintiff’s claim or injuries have occurred within the forum State.” 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 189, at 20. But the 
government acknowledged that the Court had reserved the question of whether “arising out of” 
and “related to” describe different connections. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 n.10 (1984)). 
 203. 466 U.S. 408. 
 204. Id. at 414. 
 205. Id. at 415 n.10 (“Absent any briefing on the issue, we decline to reach the questions (1) 
whether the terms ‘arising out of’ and ‘related to’ describe different connections between a cause 
of action and a defendant’s contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie between a cause of 
action and a defendant’s contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination that either 
connection exists.”). 
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have challenged Justice Alito’s narrative that Supreme Court precedent 
fully answered the issue presented in BMS.  
3.  The Mystery of the Problematic Precedent 
Justice Alito’s opinion rapidly dismisses the sliding-scale approach 
because it permits specific jurisdiction without “any adequate link” 
between the claims and the forum.206 While he asserts that the litigation 
relationship among the plaintiffs’ cases is insufficient, he never explains 
why this is so.207 Instead, he relies on Walden v. Fiore208 as a precedent 
that “illustrates [the] requirement [of a connection between the forum and 
the specific claims].”209 
Yet, from the Court’s own summary, Walden provides little useful 
guidance. In Walden, the plaintiffs sought to establish specific 
jurisdiction over intentional tort claims based entirely on the 
foreseeability of injury occurring in the forum state.210 The Court, 
following precedent, unanimously found that no contacts could be 
established for the defendant by the unilateral acts of the plaintiff.211 
Unlike Walden, the defendant in BMS conceded it had extensive 
contacts in California, and it made a further concession that it had 
contacts that supported specific personal jurisdiction over some claims.212 
Thus, Walden can provide analogous authority only after the Court has 
dismissed both the significance of BMS’s extensive forum conduct (for 
jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims) and the significance 
of the defendant’s out-of-state conduct that caused injuries similar to the 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
 207. In contrast, Justice Werdegar offered a reasoned explanation for why the litigation 
contacts should not count, emphasizing that contacts must be legally relevant and that narrowing 
jurisdiction promoted the goals of predictability and foreseeability that she attributed to the due 
process limits on specific jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d 874, 899, 907 (Cal. 2016) 
(Werdegar, J., dissenting), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 208. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).  
 209. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (citing Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124). 
 210. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1120.  
 211. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123) (“[A] 
defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for 
jurisdiction.”); see also id. at 1781–82 (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1126) (“Because the 
‘relevant conduct occurred entirely [outside the forum state] . . . the mere fact that [this] conduct 
affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State d[id] not suffice to authorize  
jurisdiction.’”). 
 212. Petition for Review at 6, Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d 874 (No. 221038). 
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in-state injuries.213 Yet, this was precisely the conduct that the lower 
courts looked to in finding personal jurisdiction.214 
Neither Walden nor any other case addressed the issue of first 
impression before the Court in BMS—whether a defendant properly 
before the California court on the residents’ claims was subject to 
personal jurisdiction on additional similar claims. But in arguably the 
closest case, the Court had permitted one state with specific jurisdiction 
over a libel claim brought by a nonresident to decide all damages against 
a defendant, even though most of the damages were experienced outside 
the state215—a decision that Justice Alito distinguished on the ground that 
it concerned damages resulting from a single claim rather than multiple 
claims.216 
4.  The Mystery of the Missing Methodology 
Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s elaborated a two-part analysis 
for specific jurisdiction217 that lower courts expanded into the three-part 
analytic framework applied by the lower courts in BMS: (1) the 
defendant’s acts or contacts must be in or purposefully directed toward 
the forum state; (2) the plaintiffs’ claims arise from or relate to the 
defendant’s forum contacts; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Justice Alito observed that the contacts are weaker than those in Walden because the 
plaintiff in Walden was a resident of the forum state and suffered an injury in that state. Bristol-
Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1782. 
 214. See supra notes 39, 61–66 and accompanying text. 
 215. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772, 781 (1984). Justice Alito found 
the case inapposite.  
[Keeton] concerned jurisdiction to determine the scope of a claim involving in-
state injury and injury to residents of the State, not, as in this case, jurisdiction to 
entertain claims involving no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the 
forum State. Keeton held that there was jurisdiction . . . to consider the full 
measure of the plaintiff’s claim, but whether she could actually recover out-of-
state damages was a merits question governed by New Hampshire libel law. 
Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1782 (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 778). 
 216. See supra notes 123, 164, 176 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s effort to 
distinguish Keeton). 
 217. First, there must be minimum contacts; second, the exercise of jurisdiction must be 
reasonable. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 103 (1987); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). In elaborating the test, the Court 
identified five specific factors to consider in determining reasonableness. Further, it observed that 
when a defendant established minimum contacts by directing activities at forum residents, then 
the defendant must make a compelling case that other factors would make specific jurisdiction 
unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). The application of 
these factors decided the outcome in Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–14.  
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reasonable under the circumstances.218 The controversy in the case 
concerned the application only of the second (relatedness) requirement. 
It is not clear whether Justice Alito accepted the established 
framework. In rejecting California court’s broad approach to relatedness, 
he reiterated the Court’s dichotomy between general and specific 
jurisdiction, and recited the restriction on general jurisdiction to places 
where a corporation is “at home,” typically where it is incorporated or 
maintains its principal place of business.219 
Their view of general jurisdiction was unnecessary to the opinion, 
because no party contended BMS was subject to general jurisdiction in 
California. In contrast to the detailed recital of doctrines governing 
general jurisdiction, Justice Alito’s opinion is silent about appropriate 
methodological framework for analyzing specific jurisdiction. The 
silence may signal Justice Alito’s repudiation of the approach to specific 
jurisdiction that has prevailed since the 1980s. He has neither employed 
that framework, nor referred to it in other opinions. His opinion in BMS 
makes clear that he does not regard reasonableness as a sufficient ground 
for specific jurisdiction, but his discussion may also suggest that he does 
not consider reasonableness a valid criterion. On the contrary, his 
treatment of the burden on the defendant discounts the concrete sources 
of inconvenience and prejudice that would be relevant to the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction, and focuses instead on abstract federalism 
interests.220 
Other members of the Court have also distanced themselves from the 
once well-established two-part framework for specific jurisdiction. In J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,221 four Justices adopted a power-
based approach to personal jurisdiction that focused on the defendant’s 
voluntary submission to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of a particular 
sovereign.222 Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that 
personal jurisdiction is “in the first instance a question of authority rather 
than fairness,”223 and expressed skepticism about the reasonableness 
evaluation undertaken by the Court in deciding earlier cases.224 
                                                                                                                     
 218. See notes 39, 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing approach of lower courts). 
 219. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). 
 220. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (lack of inconvenience does not 
eliminate challenge to personal jurisdiction because personal jurisdiction also secures federalism 
interests). 
 221. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 222. Id. at 883 (plurality opinion). 
 223. Id.  
 224. Id. (“[A] rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability[] is inconsistent 
with the premises of lawful judicial power.”). Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia had refused 
without explanation to subscribe to the part of the Asahi opinion that employed the reasonableness 
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It remains a mystery whether Justice Alito’s silence on the appropriate 
analytic framework indicates that he, too, rejects it,225 or whether he 
crafted the opinion for the Court in BMS to avoid confronting a legal issue 
on which members of the Court are sharply divided.226 
5.  The Mystery of the Sister-State Sovereign Interests 
The final mystery in Justice Alito’s opinion is the exact source and 
meaning of the sovereign interests of sister states that are promoted by 
the Court’s restrictions on California’s personal jurisdiction. Justice Alito 
sees these sovereign interests are “decisive”227 in a case like BMS where 
the litigation is not inconvenient to defendant in any practical way and 
                                                                                                                     
test. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1986) (listing all members 
of the Court except Justice Scalia as joining section II.B of opinion, which found personal 
jurisdiction unreasonable). 
The Justices proposing the submission theory regard Asahi as rightly decided but due solely 
to the lack of minimum contacts. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion). I have 
suggested elsewhere that members of the Supreme Court may be prepared to repudiate the two-
part (or three-part) approach to specific jurisdiction. MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 44 (3d ed. 2016). Justice Gorsuch’s questions during oral 
argument may suggest he regards personal jurisdiction as principally a matter of power. Transcript 
of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 25 (directing counsel to discuss issue of federalism developed 
in J. McIntyre). 
 225. Justice Alito did not join the opinion of the Justices propounding the submission theory. 
J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 887 (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Alito, J.). 
 226. Justice Ginsburg criticized the submission theory in an opinion joined by Supreme 
Court Justices Elena Kagan and Sotomayor. Id. at 901 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
plurality’s notion that consent is the animating concept [of personal jurisdiction] draws no support 
from controlling decisions of this Court.”). 
 227. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). Justice Alito characterized the burden 
on the defendant as the “primary concern.” Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). While acknowledging that the burden “obviously requires 
a court to consider the practical problems resulting from litigation in the forum,” Justice Alito did 
not address practical inconveniences, and there appear to be none. Id. Instead, he added that  
[the burden] also encompasses the more abstract matter of submitting to the 
coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in 
question. As we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction “are more than 
a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a 
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). He repeated 
language from other opinions that the “essential attributes of sovereignty” include the power to 
try cases, and that the sovereign power “implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all . . . sister 
States.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294). 
Justice Alito then wrote: “And at times, this federalism interest may be decisive.” Id. Thus, in the 
end this federalism can prevent a forum from exercising personal jurisdiction “even if the forum 
State is the most convenient location for litigation.” Id. at 1780–81 (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294). 
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might even achieve economies that benefit the forum, plaintiff, and 
defendant.228 Moreover, the constitutional requirement of some prior 
relationship between the defendant and the forum cannot explain the 
holding because, as Justice Sotomayor observed, BMS “purposefully 
availed itself” of the privilege of conducting business in California by the 
volume of its commercial activity in the state and by establishing 
minimum contacts with California that require it to litigate many claims 
in California.229 In requiring something more, Justice Alito relied instead 
on the sovereign interests of states outside California in localizing 
litigation. But the source of such sovereign interests is not clear,230 nor is 
it clear why such sovereign interests should be available as jurisdictional 
defenses to private parties in private litigation.231 States themselves have 
not articulated such interests through legislation or common law rules. 
Moreover, if a corporation’s home state had directly legislated a 
prohibition against litigation in other state courts, other states would not 
be required to respect its legislation.232 Similarly, if a corporation’s home 
state clothed its corporations with substantive immunity, other states 
would not be required to respect the immunity if they had legitimate 
reasons for disregarding it.233 
                                                                                                                     
 228. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of California 
court).  
 229. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Since the defendant is 
required to respond to the residents’ claims in the forum, “it will not be harmed by having to 
defend against [the nonresidents’] claims.” Id. at 1786. 
 230. The constitutional source of the interests has been debated by members of the Court. 
See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he constitutional limits on a 
state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state 
sovereignty.”); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1977) (“[T]he mutually 
exclusive sovereignty of the States . . . [is not] the central concern of the inquiry into personal 
jurisdiction”). 
 231. Because personal jurisdiction limits are grounded on the Due Process Clause, which 
protects the rights of persons from state action, the Court has emphasized that personal jurisdiction 
serves federalism values indirectly. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 
U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982).  
 232. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 358–61 (1914) (holding that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require sister state to respect statute prohibiting litigation of 
statutory claim outside state creating cause of action). 
 233. In contrast to the “minimum contacts” required for a forum state to exercise personal 
jurisdiction under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), due process 
requires a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts creating state interests for a 
forum state to apply its own law. See Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). Although 
the formulaic requirement of “significant contacts” seemingly requires a closer relationship 
between the forum and the litigation than minimum contacts, the contacts for choice of law may 
include circumstances other than the defendant’s forum conduct. Id. at 317 (considering plaintiff’s 
residence and work history in finding significant aggregation of contacts). 
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II.  DENIAL 
Most commentators agree that the Court’s decisions since 2011 have 
introduced significant changes to the law of personal jurisdiction.234 This 
Part reviews efforts by members of the Court to deny the change. It also 
considers serious adverse consequences of the stealth revolution. 
A.  The Exception that Proves the Rule 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. McIntyre235 provides the 
single exception to the Court’s denial that it is introducing significant 
changes to the law of personal jurisdiction. In proposing a clear new rule 
                                                                                                                     
Justice Alito does not draw on the promising efforts by Judge Werdegar in her dissent, see 
supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text, or Judge Wood in her law review article, Wood, supra 
note 193, to relate the scope of a forum’s personal jurisdiction to the scope of the forum state’s 
regulatory interest over the corporation. Their theories fit imperfectly with the fact that the Court 
has explained the limits on forum jurisdiction as a function of the presumed interest of sister states, 
not the inherent interest in corporations to be free from unwarranted state control. In any event, it 
is hard to understand how the speculative interest imputed to sister states outweighs California’s 
demonstrated interest in providing a convenient forum and the shared interests of all states in 
providing for the effective, economical adjudication of multistate disputes. See Bristol-Myers III, 
137 S. Ct. at 1786–88 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
Attitudes towards regulating corporations have come a long way. As the respondents argued, 
“states [once] retained authority to subject all persons and property within the state to their 
jurisdiction—including especially any corporation wishing to do business therein.” Brief of 
Respondents, supra note 34, at 33 (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 181–83 (1868)). 
 234. In addition to characterization of recent decisions as revolutionary, see supra note 15 
and accompanying text, other scholars have referred to radical changes introduced by the Roberts 
Court’s decisions. See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to 
Personal Jurisdiciton, 68 SMU L. REV. 107, 107 (2015) (“The Supreme Court’s two most recent 
opinions [Daimler and Walden] . . . usher in a new era in the law of general and specific personal 
jurisdiction.”); Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is Home Depot “at Home”: Daimer v. Bauman and 
the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS. L.J. 233, 292 (2014) (“The decision in 
Daimler effects a dramatic change to the law of personal jurisdiction in the United States.”); Alan 
M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 503 (2015) (“[I]t shows that 
the Supreme Court has significantly reined in general jurisdiction to an extent that would have 
been surprising just four years ago. . . . [The] Court has tightened the concept of general 
jurisdiction to an extent that, until quite recently, would have been unfathomable.”); Trammell, 
supra, at 522 (“The last three years have witnessed a sea change in the Supreme Court’s general 
jurisdiction case law.”); Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme Court’s 
New Personal Jurisdiction Case Law, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL. 209, 267–68 (2015) 
(considering pro-corporation and anti-plaintiff bias of cases); see also Vitiello, supra, at 276 
(“[The Court] without a clear explanation of its underlying theory . . . radically[] scaled 
back . . . [the] availability [of general jurisdiction].”). See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The 
Twilight of the Minimum Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1 (2014) (describing the 
practical decline of traditional standards articulated in International Shoe).  
 235. See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 879 (plurality opinion) (“This Court’s Asahi decision may 
be responsible in part for that [lower] court’s error regarding the stream of commerce, and this 
case presents an opportunity to provide greater clarity.”). 
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for stream-of-commerce cases, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the 
outcome was not dictated by settled law.236 His opinion also differed 
notably from BMS and other opinions, conceding that the Supreme Court 
was itself responsible for the legal uncertainty confronting the lower 
courts. Instead of castigating lower courts for lawless disregard of 
controlling authority or for improperly grasping jurisdiction, Justice 
Kennedy expressed respect for the efforts of the lower courts to reach 
constitutionally appropriate results.237 
B.  The Narrative of Lower Court Intransigence 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion in J. 
McIntyre, in contrast, comported with the Court’s practice in other 
opinions. He concurred with the holding but insisted, “In my view, the 
outcome of this case is determined by our precedents.”238 He offered no 
suggestion for a new approach to the problem of stream of commerce, but 
declared simply that the case was factually distinguishable from other 
situations where the Court has approved of specific jurisdiction based on 
the stream of commerce theory.239 Justice Breyer’s explanation followed 
the pattern set by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion for 
a unanimous court in Walden v. Fiore, where the Court faced a difficult 
matter that it had never addressed—the sorts of contacts required for 
intentional torts where the tortfeasor foresees causing injury in the 
plaintiff’s home state.240 Justice Thomas denied that the Court was 
addressing a new issue on which lower courts were divided. On the 
contrary, he explained: “Well-established principles of personal 
jurisdiction are sufficient to decide this case.”241 
Opinions that present the case as narrowly controlled by precedent fail 
to acknowledge the legal indeterminacy that lower courts face and, 
accordingly, fail to recognize the value of the lower courts’ efforts to 
achieve just results. Such opinions promote the view that the lower courts 
are failing to apply settled law. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 236. Id. at 877. 
 237. Justice Kennedy explained, “the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion 
with careful attention to this Court’s cases and to its own precedent.” Id. And he noted that the 
judicial metaphor (“stream of commerce”) may itself have caused confusion. Id. (“[T]he ‘stream 
of commerce’ metaphor carried the decision far afield.”); id. at 881 (“[L]ike other metaphors, [it] 
has its deficiencies as well as its utility.”). 
 238. Id. at 887 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 888 (“None of our precedents finds 
that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is 
sufficient.”). 
 239. Id. at 887. 
 240. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014).  
 241. Id. at 1126.  
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Members of the Court also communicate lack of confidence in the 
lower courts’ personal jurisdiction decisions in other ways. In Daimler, 
Justice Ginsburg stigmatized the lower court rulings by her choice of 
words to describe California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction as 
“exorbitant”242 and “grasping.”243 Justice Alito achieves a similar effect 
in BMS by referring to California’s method of finding jurisdiction as 
“spurious.”244 “Grasping” and “spurious” are not descriptive legal 
terms.245 
In BNSF, Justice Ginsburg preceded her discussion of the issue by 
reciting a series of general rules she has announced in prior cases, but 
which have no immediate application to the issues before the Court.246 
Her presentation of the history of personal jurisdiction as a sequence of 
relatively simple doctrines suggests that the plaintiffs and lower courts 
do not understand rudimentary legal principles.247 Her recitation of 
doctrines expands the volume of her opinion, and this obscures how little 
                                                                                                                     
 242. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014). 
 243. Id. at 761. 
 244. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
 245. “Grasping” connotes ruthlessness and its synonym is “covetous.” Grasping, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 508 (10th ed. 1998). “Spurious,” like “bastard,” 
pejoratively denotes illegitimate birth and more broadly connotes something false or forged. Id. 
at 1140 (defining spurious). 
 246. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017) (“Our 
precedent . . . explains that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not permit a 
State to hale an out-of-state corporation before its courts when the corporation is not ‘at home’ in 
the State and the episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere.”); see also id. at 1558 (“In International 
Shoe, this Court explained that a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant who has ‘certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). 
 247. Her simplifying characterizations of precedent themselves advance a controversial 
reform agenda, concealing adjustments to the law articulated in previous opinions. For example, 
one of the sources of a contacts-based approach to general jurisdiction is Perkins v. Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). In order to amalgamate the case with her 
newer at-home standard, Justice Ginsburg explains, “In Perkins war had forced the defendant 
corporation’s owner to temporarily relocate the enterprise from the Philippines to Ohio. Because 
Ohio then became ‘the center of the corporation’s wartime activities,’ suit was proper there . . . .” 
BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1558 (citations omitted). This is an oversimplification of the motives that led 
the company’s president to bring the company’s records to Ohio. During the war, the mining 
company had also maintained substantial assets in California. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining 
Co., 132 P.2d 70, 78 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942). But the company moved assets to Ohio and 
deposited them there in the name of the corporation’s president only after California courts had 
exercised (general) in rem jurisdiction. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438; see also Perkins, 132 P.2d 
at 96; Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 563 & n.78. Justice Sotomayor protests that the 
majority opinion “could be understood to limit that exception to the exact facts of Perkins. That 
reading is so narrow as to read the exception out of existence entirely.” BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1561 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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text she devotes to the precise problem facing the Court. Following the 
summary of general principles animating the law of personal jurisdiction, 
she dismisses the Montana court’s decision with little discussion, 
characterizing the lower court decision as resulting from an elementary 
failure to appreciate the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.248 Her 
characterization of the state court decision reinforced the impression that 
the state court acted irrationally and without legal authority.249 
But Justice Ginsburg’s historical summary simplified the law to the 
point that it provides an inadequate frame for understanding the specific 
problem that the lower courts confronted. Thus, Justice Ginsburg writes 
that the “at home” doctrine merely “clarified” earlier cases recognizing 
general jurisdiction.250 In seeking to amalgamate the at-home doctrine to 
the Court’s prior decisions, she fails to acknowledge that the at-home test 
constituted a significant shift in the law that produced substantial 
confusion among lower courts.251 
Similarly, her characterization of the Montana court’s elementary 
failure regarding the broad applicability of Fourteenth Amendment 
norms reflects her own view that Daimler applies to all cases without 
regard to the type of claims or parties. But, her declaration that Daimler 
applies universally was the issue before the Court, and the assumption 
that it must apply to all kinds of cases fails to appreciate the specific 
challenges that lower courts faced in distinguishing Justice Ginsburg’s 
broad language in Daimler from the unusual facts and extremely narrow 
issue that the Court purported to decide in that case.252 
                                                                                                                     
 248. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1558–59 (“The Montana Supreme Court distinguished Daimler on 
the ground that we did not there confront ‘a FELA claim or a railroad defendant.’ The Fourteenth 
Amendment due process constraint described in Daimler, however, applies to all state-court 
assertions of general jurisdiction . . . ; the constraint does not vary with the type of claim asserted 
or business enterprise sued.” (citation omitted)). 
 249. Justice Ginsburg likewise sought to dismiss the objections of the dissent as reflecting a 
basic misunderstanding of the law. Id. at 1559 n.4. She insisted International Shoe elaborated the 
dichotomy between specific and general jurisdiction and that Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan 
F. Stone’s famous formula requiring “minimum contacts” applied exclusively to specific personal 
jurisdiction. Id. Justice Ginsburg’s note chastising Justice Sotomayor contains more words than 
the paragraph of the majority opinion that evaluates whether BNSF satisfies Daimler’s 
requirements for general jurisdiction in Montana. Id. Justice Sotomayor responded, pointing out 
the anachronism of this reading. Id. at 1561–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 250. Id. at 1559 (majority opinion). 
 251. E.g., Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 114 n.60 (citing cases and articles 
indicating continuing confusion after Goodyear as to whether corporations could be subject to 
general jurisdiction where they engage in substantial activity outside their place of incorporation 
and principal place of business). 
 252. The Court granted review in Daimler to decide whether jurisdictional contacts of a 
subsidiary might constitutionally be attributed to a parent. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965). While eventually found to be 
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Justice Alito’s opinion in BMS yields a similar impression of lower 
court intransigence. After reciting a series of long established legal 
doctrines,253 none of which were contested, he explains that specific 
jurisdiction limits personal jurisdiction to issues “deriving from, or 
connected with” the controversy.254 It is in this context that he announces 
that “settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction control this 
case.”255 Nothing in his discussion acknowledges that none of the Court’s 
previous decisions addressed a situation where nonresident claims were 
properly joined to residents’ claims and defendant’s forum conduct was 
sufficiently related to the residents’ claims.256 In fact, the Court had 
apparently never held that a defendant properly before the Court on some 
claims was not subject to the court’s jurisdiction for whatever additional 
claims the forum authorized under state law. 
Instead, Justice Alito insists that BMS’s conduct was constitutionally 
insufficient, relying on the general principle, which was also uncontested, 
that some activity or occurrence must occur in the forum state.257 This is 
the context in which he announces that the sliding scale approach is 
“difficult to square with our precedents”258 and announces that the case 
is governed by the “straightforward application” of settled law.259 
Finally, the Court communicates lack of confidence in the lower 
courts, further promoting the narrative of lower court intransigence, 
through its procedural decisions to decide cases on appeal rather than to 
remand them for the lower courts to decide by applying the proper 
standard. In Daimler, where the Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit improperly failed to apply Goodyear’s “at home” 
standard, the Supreme Court could have remanded with directions to 
apply the right standard; instead, it decided for itself that personal 
jurisdiction was improper.260 Similarly, in BNSF Railway Co. v. 
                                                                                                                     
erroneous, the Montana court tried to make sense of recent and significant changes to the law of 
personal jurisdiction. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1553–54. In distinguishing jurisdictional facts involving 
a railroad from those involving a foreign automobile manufacturer, the state courts demonstrated 
an understandable reluctance to over-apply the Court’s new rules. 
 253. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017). Justice Alito emphasized that general 
jurisdiction is limited to where a corporation is at home, and that specific jurisdiction is “very 
different.” Id. at 1780. 
 254. Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011)). 
 255. Id. at 1781.  
 256. Id.  
 257. Id.   
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. at 1783.  
 260. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 119 (discussing Court’s options in Daimler). 
This was the procedure adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Bristol-Myers II with the 
result that the court of appeal found that there was no general jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers I, 175 
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Tyrrell,261 where the Court held that the Montana courts failed to apply 
the “at home” standard, the Court could have remanded with instructions 
to apply the proper law; nonetheless, it decided the issue on appeal and 
on an arguably incomplete record.262 
C.  The Costs of Stealth Revolutions 
1.  Explanatory Inadequacy 
The Court has not offered much explanation for its changes to the law 
of personal jurisdiction.263 But there is reason to think that at least some 
Justices mean to offer simple rules that will guide litigators and courts.264 
If so, the Court’s overdependence on precedent frustrates its goal. Due to 
the Court’s failure to offer fuller explanations, its personal jurisdiction 
decisions create uncertainties about: (1) the reasons why general 
jurisdiction must constrict over time;265 (2) the reasons why general and 
specific jurisdiction must be conceptually exclusive and why there can be 
no hybridization;266 (3) the reasons supporting a tight relatedness 
requirement for specific jurisdiction; (4) the status of the two-part 
                                                                                                                     
Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 415, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (opinion by Brick, J., for unanimous court), aff’d, 
377 P.3d 879 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 261. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).  
 262. See id. at 1562 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[W]ith its ruling today, the Court 
unnecessarily sends a signal to the lower courts that the exceptional-circumstance inquiry is all 
form, no substance.”). 
 263. E.g., Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 
153, 157–77 (2014) (excellent discussion of the lack of reasons offered for the Court’s general 
jurisdiction decision by a scholar who is not unsympathetic to the change in law). 
 264. “Counsel, we’re dealing with the jurisdictional rule, and when we do that, we want the 
rule to be as simple as possible.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of 
Chief Justice Roberts). 
 265. The Court’s opinions nowhere explain why the Court privileged domicile-based forms 
of general jurisdiction in erecting the rule that corporations are subject to personal jurisdiction 
where they are “at home,” nor do its opinions explain why general jurisdiction must be restricted 
to the corporation’s homes or why the home places should also be narrowly construed. 
Some Justices assume but never explain why the rules for personal jurisdiction, as opposed 
to those for subject matter jurisdiction, must be simple or predictable. Simple rules do not 
necessarily promote predictability. A rule presuming valid personal jurisdiction following proof 
of service would equally promote predictability. A predictable rule that reduces otherwise valid 
state authority is predictably unconstitutional. 
 266. Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents, supra note 173, at 6 (jurisdictional gap resulting from bifurcation of specific and 
general jurisdiction); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 119, 139 (2001) (urging retention of some form of general jurisdiction due to gaps 
created by the Court’s restriction of specific jurisdiction). 
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methodological framework for specific jurisdiction;267 and (5) the 
reasons for avoiding constructions of specific jurisdiction that could 
replace older forms of general jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the Court’s assertion that its rulings are dictated by 
precedent creates two kinds of practical problems. The opinions provide 
insufficient guidance to lower courts about how to apply the holdings to 
future cases with different facts. And the Court’s reluctance to craft clear 
rules of decision and to articulate the policies for its decisions fails to 
indicate the limits to their application and thus fails to prevent the 
possible overextension of holdings to cases where they may be 
inappropriate. 
a.  Fact-Specific Holdings Minimizing Change to Settled Law 
Confuse Lower Courts 
On remand after Daimler, the California Court of Appeal in BMS 
concluded that the Court’s holding did not affect existing practices with 
respect to specific jurisdiction.268 Anticipating the Court’s broad reading 
of Daimler, Justice Werdegar dissented and concluded that there was no 
basis for specific jurisdiction.269 But she did so because she looked past 
the Court’s claims in Daimler that it was merely applying settled law; she 
understood the trajectory of recent cases as signaling a broader break with 
past practices.270 And she recognized that the post-2011 decisions 
restricting general jurisdiction were motivated by underlying policy goals 
that strongly favored a tighter relatedness requirement for specific 
jurisdiction.271 Justice Werdegar thus got the result right, but she did so 
                                                                                                                     
 267. See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s avoidance of 
the test in recent opinions). 
 268. See Bristol-Myers I, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 415, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (opinion by 
Brick, J., for unanimous court), aff’d, 377 P.3d 879 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); 
Alani Golanski, Why Daimler Accommodates Personal Jurisdiction in Mass Tort Litigations, 80 
ALB. L. REV. 311, 311–12, 332 (2017). The Court of Appeal reasoned that Daimler did not affect 
“flourish[ing]” specific personal jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers I, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 425. 
 269. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d 874, 896 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).   
 270. Id. (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (recognizing that Daimler 
“wrought . . . a much tighter ‘at home’ limit.”). Justice Werdegar understood that the Court’s 
categorical separation between general and specific jurisdiction and its restriction of general 
jurisdiction reflected a policy that required courts to prevent specific jurisdiction from recapturing 
general jurisdiction. See id. at 896–97. 
 271. Justice Werdegar cautioned that the California court’s approach, by minimizing 
relatedness, undermines an important distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. Id. at 
896. Without any clear guidance from the Court’s decisions, she attempted to identify 
constitutional principles served by the relatedness requirement, arguing that weakening 
relatedness extends personal jurisdiction beyond a state’s legitimate regulatory interest. See id. at 
896. 
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because she understood that the Supreme Court meant to do more than it 
said. 
b.  Lack of Articulated Rules and Policies Fails to Prevent 
Overapplication of Holdings 
By relying on precedent without articulating rules of decision and 
policies, the Court also fails to provide necessary guidance that can serve 
to prevent the future extension of holdings to cases where they would be 
inappropriate. This danger is illustrated by the concerns raised by 
plaintiffs’ counsel in BMS that a tight relatedness requirement for each 
claim could prevent personal jurisdiction over nonresident claimants 
necessary to settle decedents’ estates.272 Because the Court’s opinion in 
BMS offers little independent explanation for the holding, it is hard to 
find clear policies that limit the reach of the holding. 
2.  Precedent as Pretext 
The Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions have moved 
relentlessly in one direction—the curtailment of personal jurisdiction—
cumulatively resulting in a program of law reform that systematically 
benefits defendants. The lack of reasoned explanations for the legal 
change, coupled with the Court’s unconvincing reliance on precedent,273 
provides support for critics who propose that conservative values of 
members of the Court have led them to favor the interests of corporations 
and defendants,274 and to disfavor plaintiffs.275 
Other scholars have sought to understand the Court’s drive to restrict 
jurisdiction as an ideological commitment to territorial sovereignty or as 
a libertarian hostility toward courts reflected in hostility toward 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.276 But whether explained as motivated by 
individual bias towards a class of parties or by unarticulated ideological 
convictions, the Court’s decisions lose any claim to neutrality and 
transparency, raising questions as to whether members of the Court can 
                                                                                                                     
 272. See Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017) (discussing argument in 
respondents’ brief). 
 273. See supra notes 207–13 and accompanying text (discussing extension of Walden to 
different legal situation). 
 274. VITIELLO, supra note 8, at 69 (considering possible pro-corporate bias of conservative 
members of the Court). 
 275. Id. at 69–70 (discussing possible anti-plaintiff bias of Court).  
 276. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 157, at 788 (footnotes omitted) (“The personal 
jurisdiction cases speak more generally to the Roberts Court’s commitment to formalism and 
respect for territorial boundaries. . . . In general, the formalist approach favors bright-line rules 
over more malleable cost-benefit analyses. In the personal jurisdiction realm, the Court’s formalist 
approach suggests a sharply limited role for the judiciary as well as a skepticism of plaintiffs’ 
broad forum choices.”).  
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be persuaded by legal argument,277 and undermining core values of the 
rule of law. 
3.  Devaluing the Work of Lower Courts 
In relying solely on its own prior decisions to craft bright-line rules 
that cabin lower court decision-making authority, the Court jettisons the 
accumulated experience of many lower court judges over many years.278 
Yet, it is the lower court judges that have acquired the most direct 
experience in administering the rules governing personal jurisdiction, and 
they have most frequently observed the consequences of jurisdictional 
rules. The narrative of lower court intransigence prevents the Supreme 
Court from acknowledging the value of the work of the lower courts and 
deprives the Court of the accumulated experience of many judges.279 
4.  Discounting the Real Interests of the Forum State, Overprotecting 
the Intangible Interests of Other States, and Devaluing 
Plaintiffs’ Interests 
The Court’s decisions since 2011 have reduced the adjudicatory 
jurisdiction of states and limited plaintiffs’ access to courts. But, in failing 
to provide robust explanations to support its changes to the law, the Court 
has failed to adequately consider the sovereign interests of states and has 
devalued plaintiffs’ need for access to courts at the same time that it has 
arguably overvalued the defendant’s interest in avoiding litigation in 
particular forums. 
For example, in attributing the “at home” doctrine to prior cases and 
applying it ever more aggressively, Justice Ginsburg never offers an 
explanation for why due process mandates general jurisdiction in the 
corporation’s home places, why the corporate home states have an 
interest in clothing their corporations with jurisdictional immunity in 
                                                                                                                     
 277. A sufficient explanation for the Court’s explanatory reticence may be the failure of a 
majority of the Justices to agree on any coherent theory of personal jurisdiction. Cornett & 
Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 155–58 (discussing conflicting views on the Supreme Court); see 
also supra notes 219–22 (discussing Supreme Court Justices’ indecisiveness). But lack of 
agreement does not explain why members of the Court repeatedly deny or minimize the scope of 
constitutional change wrought by the decisions. Agreement on results without agreement on 
reasons could be communicated by seriatim opinions, none subscribed by a majority, as was the 
case in J. McIntyre. 
 278. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 157, at 789 (“The Court’s formalist approach to 
shaping personal jurisdiction allowed the Court to jettison decades of lower-court doctrinal 
development.”). 
 279. For example, the Court failed to acknowledge any of the arguments about splits of 
authority regarding the relatedness requirement, nor did it acknowledge the widespread approval 
of federal pendent personal jurisdiction by lower courts. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, 
at 46; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 5; supra Subsection I.D.1.a.i. 
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other states, or why other states where the corporations are active and 
present have no interest in providing a forum for claims unrelated to the 
forum.280 It is not clear what sovereign or party interests are served when 
the Court applies the “at home” doctrine in BNSF to prevent Mr. Nelson, 
the injured railroad worker, from litigating in a state that is more 
convenient to him. As result of the rules announced in BNSF, Mr. Nelson 
must now litigate far from his home state of North Dakota.281 Even 
though the railroad employed him in his home state to drive its trucks 
around the country, he must either litigate in the state of Washington 
where he was injured or in Minnesota and Delaware, where the 
corporation makes its home.282 The costs to the plaintiff are real. The 
inconvenience to the defendant of litigating in Montana is speculative. 
Justice Alito’s opinion in BMS acknowledged that a determination of 
personal jurisdiction requires a consideration of the interests of the 
plaintiff and the state, but it emphasized that the primary concern is the 
protection of defendants from burdensome litigation.283 In fact, the 
opinion gave conclusive weight to the defendant’s abstract interest in 
being free from coerced litigation in any state lacking an appropriate 
interest in the litigation.284 Justice Alito failed to evaluate concrete, 
identifiable interests of the forum state.285 And he attributed the out-of-
state corporate defendant’s abstract interest in avoiding personal 
jurisdiction to the collective interests of sister-state sovereigns in 
preventing personal jurisdiction where there was no forum conduct.286 
                                                                                                                     
 280. The restriction of general jurisdiction to places where a corporation is at home was 
rationalized originally as a concession to the plaintiffs’ need for at least one forum. Von Mehren 
& Trautman, supra note 169, at 1177. But the concession to plaintiffs’ need does not explain why 
home states should be saddled with the burden of litigating claims against their own corporations 
when those claims arise elsewhere.  
281. See BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1561 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 282. See id. (“It is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the actions of a farflung foreign 
corporation, who will bear the brunt of the majority’s approach and be forced to sue in distant 
jurisdictions with which they have no contacts or connection.”). 
 283. See Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).  
 284. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 285. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81. The California Supreme Court justices found 
that personal jurisdiction advanced forum regulatory interests. Bristol-Myers II, 377 P.3d 874, 
892 (Cal. 2016). And Justice Werdegar, in dissenting below, carefully considered the possibility 
that economies of consolidation could benefit California residents sufficiently to support personal 
jurisdiction—though she ultimately found no such economies in the case. Id. at 904 (Werdegar, 
J., dissenting). Examining facts of case, she concluded that economy of scale could be achieved 
and all California plaintiffs could be adequately represented without presence of nonresidents, 
thus eliminating any real California state interest. Id. 
 286. Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81. As Justice Sotomayor objected, the assumption 
that non-forum states share an interest in effectively immunizing non-forum defendants for non-
forum conduct makes no sense. Id. at 1786–87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Especially with respect 
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Justice Alito supported the newfound sovereign interests by neither 
precedent nor constitutional principle. As with Justice Ginsburg’s formal 
application of the at-home doctrine, Justice Alito effectively gave 
conclusive weight to one interest, the defendant’s interest in avoiding 
litigation.287 Under the Court’s enforcement of the defendant’s intangible 
interest, it is not hard to envisage a case where states share common 
regulatory interests, but no state can enforce them. For example, in the 
dispute in Shutts,288 a petroleum corporation had wrongfully withheld 
millions of dollars of interest from royalty owners but the average claim 
was one hundred dollars. While each state had an interest in providing an 
effective forum for its resident plaintiffs (and possibly others), many 
smaller states would not have sufficient residents to make consolidated 
litigation feasible; indeed, it possible in such a case that no single state 
would have enough plaintiffs to make litigation cost-effective. Despite 
the fact that all states would share a common interest in providing a 
forum, the Court’s decision in BMS could have the effect of depriving 
any state from exercising personal jurisdiction, other than the defendant’s 
home state. Consequently, if the defendant were a foreign corporation 
headquartered outside the United States, no domestic forum would be 
available. And this result is grounded, ultimately, on the abstract interest 
of the defendant that is supposedly advancing the shared interest of non-
forum states.289 
In restricting both general and specific personal jurisdiction, the Court 
has relied on formal rules or privileged the abstract burden on the 
defendant, signaling that the regulatory interests of the forum state and 
the plaintiffs’ need for a meaningful access to justice count for little to 
nothing in the constitutional calculus for personal jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
With the 2017 decision of BMS, the Supreme Court has now decided 
six cases since 2011 that impose significant new constitutional 
restrictions on the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction. Yet, in the 
opinions explaining those decisions, members of the Court repeatedly 
deny that they are altering settled law.  
                                                                                                                     
to nationwide conduct and claims, it makes more sense to assume that the states share common 
interests. 
 287. Id. at 1780–81 (majority opinion) (noting that there are a variety of interests a court 
should consider when personal jurisdiction is at issue, but the primary interest is the burden on 
the defendant).   
 288. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 801 (1985). 
 289. Phillips Petroleum Co. was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business 
in Oklahoma and would thus have been subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware and Oklahoma. 
Id. at 799. The average claim was $100. Id. at 801. A foreign corporation with its headquarters 
overseas would not be subject to general jurisdiction in any state. 
53
Hoffheimer: The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
552 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
This Article closely examines BMS and the other Roberts Court 
personal jurisdiction decisions. It claims the Roberts Court is engaging in 
a stealth revolution—radically transforming the law of personal 
jurisdiction while insisting that the Court’s holdings are dictated by 
controlling precedent. This Article argues that the Court’s denial of 
change prevents the Court from elaborating a coherent explanation for its 
new approach, confuses lower courts and lawyers about the magnitude of 
the legal change, and fosters a narrative of lower court lawlessness that is 
not supported by the record. 
This Article urges the Court to acknowledge that it is reforming the 
law of personal jurisdiction, to provide reasons for the new restrictions 
on the power of courts that are grounded on constitutional principle and 
sound policy, and to construct a narrative that relates its programmatic 
reform of personal jurisdiction to the history and purpose of the Due 
Process Clause or to some other appropriate constitutional authority. 
Alternatively, the Court should slow the revolution until a majority of 
Justices can explain the constitutional grounds that require depriving yet 
another state court of an essential attribute of sovereignty and yet another 
plaintiff of a day in court. 
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